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MEMORANDUM 
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January 3, 1989 V 
FROM: Hew 
RE: Stef Cassella 
Stef Cassella, counsel to the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee called to inquire about the Ad Hoc Committee on Federal 
Habeas Review of Capital Sentences. In response to his 
questions I provided the names of the Committee members and 
a general description of the Committee's task. Cassella 
seemed most interested in knowing when a report was likely 
to be completed, and I told him that a date had not been 
set. 
In response to my questions on the provisions in the 
Anti-Drug Abuse Act concerning the Committee, Cassella said 
that the basic effect of the provision would be to require 
Joe Biden to introduce some habeas reform legislation, which 
he has been reluctant to do. Whatever bill is introduced by 
Biden or by Strom Thurmond will be discharged from Committee 
and be voted on by the Senate. The House is not bound to do 
anything. Cassella said that any proposal would have been 
"buried" by former House Judiciary Committee Chairman Rodi-
no, but that the new chairman, Jack Brooks of Texas, favors 










January 3, 1989 
Habeas Committee -- John Daly 
~ 
John Daly from the Washington office of the State of 
Florida called with general inquiries on the Committee, 
which I answered. He was particularly interested in whether 
the Committee would be receiving public testimony, the pro-
jected date of the Committee's report, and the effect of the 
provisions of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act. 
I informed Daly that Prof. Pearson had communicated 
with the AG' s off ices in the CA5 and CAll states. Daly 
stated that Florida has a Democratic AG and a Republican 
governor (Martinez), and implied that communication was not 
the best between the two offices. Gov. Martinez is very 
interested in habeas reform, and asks that the Commit tee 




Florida Washington Office, 
Hall of States, Suite 287 
444 N. Capital St. 






lfp/ss 01/05/89 COMM SALLY-POW 
Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas 
MEMO TO FILE: 
Judge Robert Huntley of the Idaho Supreme Court 
called me today. He previously had expressed an interest in 
the work of our Committee, and we have a letter from him in 
the file. 
In our discussion today he stated that his primary 
interest was administrative. He has been studying (collect-
ing information) the causes of delay in state courts primar~ 
ily at the trial level. He characterizes the problem as 
"gross inefficiency". He cited the case of a state court 
judge in a capital case who failed for 17 months to enter a 
routine order. 
I advised him that our mandate was limited to re-
petitive habeas review, particularly in the federal courts. 
But I responded affirmatively when he asked whether our com-
mittee would like to have the benefit of his research. I 




January 5 , 1989 
Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Hah~as 
Dear Judge Huntley: 
A brief note to thank you for your telephone call . 
Although our specific mission is to consider causes of delay 
attributable to repetitive habeas corpus review, your inves-
tigation and study of administrative delay - often due to 
negligence or incompetency - certainly would be of interest . 
The Committee wou]d be happy to receive a copy of your in-
vestigation . 
It wo1Jld he helpful if you also sent a copy direct-
ly to our Reporter, Professor Albert M. Pearson , School of 
Law, University of Georgia , Athens , Georgia 30602 . Profes -
sor Pearson is working with the offires of the state attor-
neys general in the Fifth and Eleventh Fe<leral Circuits . 
Our Committee meets again on January 30 . 
I mentioned that the American Bar Association also 
has a study underway . The Chairman is Judge Alvin B. Rubin, 
2440 One American Place , Baton Rouge , Louisiana 70825 , an 
able member of the Fifth Circuit Federal Court of Appeals . 
Sincerely , 
Hon . Robert G. Huntley , Jr . 
Supreme Court of Idaho 
Supreme Court Building 
451 West State Street 
Boise , Idaho 83720 
lfp/ss 
cc: Professor Albert M. Pearson 
- -
January 9, 1989 
Dear Al: 
Justice Powell is interested in knowing whether there 
is any available information on the racial composition of 
juries in death penalty cases, and suggested that I write 
you for help. Perhaps the NAACP Legal Defense and Education 
Fund, Inc. has some figures. I have asked the library re-
search staff here to see what they can find, and will let 
you know what they say. 
The Justice also mentioned that it would be helpful to 
have a memo summarizing your progress in gathering data 
about a week before the January 30 meeting. I look forward 
to seeing you then. 
Professor Albert M. Pearson 
School of Law 
University of Georgia 
Athens, Georgia 30602 
Sincerely, 
R. Hewitt Pate 
- • 
January 12, 1989 
Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas 
Dear Chief: 
The Committee meets again at 9:30 a.m. on Monday, 
January 30. 
Jo and I have been invited to a dinner here at the 
Court to be given by the Smithsonian on the evening of Sun-
day, January 29. The other four judges on our Committee 
(Chief Judges Clark and Roney, and DC Judges Hodges and 
Sanders) will be in the city that evening. If you think it 
appropriate, it would be nice if they (with spouses, if any) 
were invited. 
Of course, I have not mentioned this to them, and 
will understand if this is inappropriate or difficult. 





• OFFICE OF THE 
AT10RNEY GENERAL 
DoN SIEGELMAN 
ArfoRNEY G ENERAL 
MONTGOMERY, ALABAMA 36130 
(205) 261-7400 
J\l\ 1. "l ,~i~ 
-
STATE OF ALABAMA 
January 12, 1989 
Professor Albert M. Pearson 
School of Law 
University of Georgia 
Athens, GA 30602 
Dear Professor Pearson: 
-
~ 
Enclosed, as we discu yesterda.r.?. a e various materials 
relating to the work of e Ad Hoc comm1tte on Federal Habeas. 
These materials include ists of all Uni a States Supreme 
court and federal appella court d ions in post-Furman 
capital cases, with the only exception being those which have 
not yet made the Federal second Reporter advance sheets. 
The decisions list is provided to you in two formats. 
First, there is a computer printout of the decisions listed 
alphabetically by case name with the citation at which each 
decision appears, but with no subsequent case history 
citation. Also enclosed are lists in typewritten page format 
of the decisions by federal circuit with subsequent case 
history supplied. 
These lists, which contain 596 decisions, are drawn from a 
computer program which I use to keep up with all the 
post-Furman federal appellate court holdings in capital cases. 
Note that the lists are of decisions rather than cases. For 
example, where a post-Furman capital case resulted in a panel 
decision, an en bane decision, and a Supreme court decision 
there will be a total of three decisions, each with its 
separate citation, for that case. What the lists represent are 
every published federal appellate court decision in a capital 
case that I have been able to locate, read, and plug its issues 
into my computer system. I believe the lists to be at least 
99% complete. 
In using the case lists, you should ignore the one to four 
digit number to the left of each listed decision. That number 
is simply a computer number which I use to program the cases 




Professor Albert M. Pearson 
January 12, 1989 
Page Two 
-
Also enclosed, as you requested, is a complete procedural 
history in chronological order for each of the three Alabama 
cases which have gone through to execution in the post-Furman 
era. If the execution which we have scheduled for later this 
month occurs, I will send you a chronological history for that 
case, also. 
By copy of this letter, I am informing the committee 
members of the materials being transmitted to you, but due to 
the bulk of those materials, I have not enclosed copies for 
each of the committee members. However, I will glady do so 
should any of the members desire them. 
Please let me know what else I can do to assist you and 




Assistant Attorney General 
EC/jaf 
Enclosures 
cc: Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist 
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
0808t 
Hon. Paul H. Roney 
Hon. Charles Clark 
Hon. Barefoot Sanders 
Hon. William Terrell Hodges 
William L. Burchill, Jr. Esquire 
Noel J. Augustyn, Esquire 
---
- -
January ]8, 1989 
Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas 
Dear General Carnes: 
A brief note to thank you for the copy of your let-
ter to Professor Pearson. 
The materials you have sent him will certainly be 
of assistance, particularly the complete procedural history 
of the three Alabama casea in whic~ the defendant has been 
executed. 
I am speaking for the Committee when I send warm 
thanks. 
Sincerely, 
Hon. Ed Carnes 
Assistant Attorney General 
State of Alabama 
Montgomery, Alabama 36130 
lfp/ss 
cc: Professor Albert M. Pearson 
"' 
WILLIAM W SCHWARZER 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
450 GOLDEN GATE AVENUE 
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94102 
January 18, 1989 
Honorable Lewis F. Powell 
Retired Associate Justice 
Supreme Court of the United States 
1 First Street, NE 
Washington, D. C. 20543 
Dear Justice Powell: 
JJHJ 2 3 1989 
Enclosed is a copy of the paper I mentioned in 
my recent letter to you being presented to 
California Trial Judges as a part of the effort to 
promote better understanding of Federal Habeas 
Corpus and, it is hoped, to reduce resort to it. 
With best regards, 
Sic~c;, 
William W Schwarzer 
Enclosure 
f. t,,;__ " , ... 
I 
, 4 .A 
A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF 
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS LAW 
The purpose of this memorandum is to address a problem that 
state and federal courts share: federal post-conviction review 
of state court judgments. The writ of habeas corpus permits a 
prisoner to challenge his conviction on federal constitutional 
grounds. Although the writ provides important protection for the 
constitutional rights of defendants, its widespread use has also 
been a source of tension between the state and federal judicial 
systems and of public dissatisfaction with the administration of 
criminal justice. Whether the conditions for granting federal 
post-conviction relief should be tightened has been a subject of 
great controversy. But, however the debate is resolved, the most 
immediate concern is, and will continue to be, how to reduce the 
causes for post-conviction relief. 
This memorandum examines the principal grounds on the basis 
of which federal courts, principally the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, which has jurisdiction of California, have granted 
relief to defendants convicted in state courts. It is intended 
simply to report what the federal courts have done and how they 
might be expected to deal with particular problems or situations. 
It is not intended to suggest to state court judges how they 
should conduct trials in their courts. The assumption underlying 
this memorandum is that, although state court judges are 
thoroughly familiar with California law, they may not have the 
opportunity to follow federal habeas law. The objective is, 




the common interest of state and federal judges in reducing the 
incidence of meritorious habeas petitions. 
Because of time and space constraints, this memorandum is 
not exhaustive. It covers the taking of guilty pleas, 
evidentiary rulings, some aspects of the right to counsel, jury 
instructions, exposure of jurors to extrinsic evidence, and 
prosecutorial misconduct. Some issues, such as jury selection, 
ineffective assistance of counsel, competency to stand trial, 
vindictive sentencing, double jeopardy, and mistrial motions, are 
not covered. The main objective in selecting case citations was 
to find clear statements of rules and representative fact 
patterns, not to cite every case on point. 
I. GUILTY PLEAS 
A guilty plea forecloses all grounds for habeas corpus 
relief except that the plea itself is not voluntary and 
intelligent. 1 If the defendant is fully aware of the direct 
penal consequences of his plea, including the significance of any 
commitments made to him by the court, the prosecutor, or his own 
attorney, then the plea is valid unless it is induced by threats, 
misrepresentations, mistake, or unenforceable or unethical 
promises. 2 If the defendant pleads guilty on the advice of 
counsel, the plea is voluntary unless counsel was ineffective. 3 
If the defendant waived his right to counsel, that waiver itself 
2 
3 
Tollet v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973). 
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970). 
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985). 
2 
~ 
must have been voluntary and intelligent. 
A habeas court determines whether a plea was voluntary and 
intelligent based on a review of the entire record, especially 
the record of the plea proceeding. Therefore, the making of an 
accurate and complete record of the proceeding is vital. 4 The 
representations made by the defendant, his attorney, and the 
prosecutor at such a proceeding, as well as any findings made by 
the judge accepting the plea are presumed to be true and will 
generally be accepted by the habeas court at face value. 5 
Pre-plea questioning by the court on the record should cover 
the following matters: that the defendant is mentally competent 
and not under the effects of drugs or alcohol; 6 that the 
defendant understands the relevant law in relation to the facts; 7 
that the defendant understands the charge against him and the 
elements that the state must prove; 8 and that a sufficient 
factual basis exists for the plea. 9 The court should also ask 
the defendant, his attorney, and the prosecutor what promises 
have been made to the defendant as part of the plea agreement. 
4 See Boykin v. Alabama, 3.~.5 U.S. 238, 243-44 (1969). 
5 Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977). 
6 See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 756 (1970). 
7 See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969). 
8 See Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 647 (1976) (guilty 
plea invalid because defendant unaware that intent to kill is 
necessary element of second degree murder). 
9 Th~ defendant need not admit that he committed the crime 
charged if there is otherwise a sufficient factual basis to 




And the court should make sure that the defendant understands 
that, although the prosecution is bound by the agreement, the 
court is not bound and is free to exercise its judgment in 
imposing sentence. 
The court must inform the defendant of the direct penal 
consequences of pleading guilty. 10 Direct consequences include 
* the giving up of the constitutional rights against 
compulsory self incrimination, to trial by jury, and to 
call and confront witnesses; 11 
* the maximum and, where applicable, the minimum punishment 
provided by law; 12 
* a mandatory parole term13 or ineligibility for parole; 14 
* restitution; and 
* anything within the discretion of the sentencing judge. 15 
Under current law, the court need not inform the defendant 
of the indirect consequences of pleading guilty, although in 
cases where they are significant it is well to include them. 
Indirect consequences include 
10 
11 
Brady v. United States, _397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970). 
See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969). 
12 United States ex rel. Pebworth v. Conte, 489 F. 2d 266, 
267 (9th Cir. 1974). 
13 Carter v. McCarthy, 806 F.2d 1373, 1375 (9th Cir. 1986) 
(considering Cal. Penal Code§ 3000), cert. denied, 108 s. Ct. 
198 (1987). 
14 Munich v. United States, 337 F.2d 356, 361 (9th Cir. 
1964), overruled on other grounds, Heiden v. United States, 353 
F.2d 53 (9th Cir. 1965). 
15 Torrey v. Estelle, 842 F.2d 234, 236 (9th cir. 1988). 
4 
* the possibility that sentences may run consecutively;
16 
* the possibility of early release;
17 
* the possibility that parole may be revoked;
18 
* the possibility that the defendant may be deported;
19 
* civil tax liability; 20 
* the possibility of an undesirable military discharge;
21 
* the possibility of civil commitment;
22 
* the possibility that a juvenile may later be sentenced as 
an adult if youth authorities determine that he is not 
amenable to youth authority treatment; 23 and 
* anything that depends on the subsequent behavior of the 
defendant or is in the control of an agency independent 
of the sentencing judge.~ 
Finally, if the defendant is represented by counsel, the 
court should ask whether he is pleading guilty on the advice of 
counsel, and, if so, whether he has fully consulted with counsel 
and is satisfied with the advice. The questioning should be 
16 United States v. Rubalcaba, 811 F.2d 491, 494 {9th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 107 {1987). 
17 Carter v. McCarthy, 806 F.2d 1373, 1375 {9th Cir. 1986), 
cert. denied, 108 s. ct. 198 {1987). 
18 Sanchez v. United states, 572 F. 2d 210, 211 {9th Cir. 
1977) • 
19 Fruchtman v. Kenton, 531 F.2d 946, 949 {9th Cir.), cert. 





United States v. King, 618 F.2d 550, 553 {9th Cir. 
Redwine v. zuckert, 317 F.2d 336 {D.C. Cir. 1963). 
George v. Black, 732 F.2d 108, 111 {8th Cir. 1984). 
23 Torrey v. Estelle, 842 U.S. 234, 236 {9th Cir. 1988). 
24 Torrey v. Estelle, 842 F.2d 234, 236 {9th Cir. 1988). 
5 
sufficient to preclude a subsequent sixth amendment attack on the 
ground that counsel was ineffective. 25 
A failure to satisfy these constitutional requirements may 
be excused if it can be shown that the defendant received the 
missing advice and information from other sources, such as his 
attorney, 26 or if the failure is harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.u 
II. EVIDENTIARY RULINGS 
Erroneous evidentiary rulings do not afford a basis for 
federal habeas corpus relief unless they violate the defendant's 
federal constitutional rights. 28 The principal relevant 
constitutional provisions are the fourteenth amendment due 
process clause and the sixth amendment confrontation clause. A 
federal court will not hear a claim that evidence was obtained as 
a result of a search or seizure violating the fourth amendment if 
the defendant had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the 
merits of that claim in state court. 29 
25 To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the 
defendant must satisfy the two-prong test of Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 
58-59 (1985). To show prejudice, the defendant must show a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would 
not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on a trial. Id. 
26 
~, Quiroz v. Wawrzaszek, 749 F.2d 1375, 1378 (9th 
cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1055 (1985). 
27 See Carter v. McCarthy, 806 F.2d 1373, 1377 (9th Cir. 
1986), cert. denied, 108 S. ct. 198 (1987). 
28 
29 
See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119 (1982). 
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482 (1976). 
6 
. 
A. Due process analysis 
Erroneous admission or exclusion of evidence violates the 
defendant's due process rights only if it renders the trial 
"fundamentally unfair. 1130 Only in rare cases will a petitioner 
be able to meet this standard; the survey conducted for this 
memorandum did not turn up any case in which relief was granted 
on due process grounds for erroneous admission of evidence. 
Where the claim is based on exclusion of evidence, the 
petitioner must satisfy a rigorous balancing test that accords 
substantial weight to the state's interests in preserving orderly 
trials, in judicial efficiency, and in excluding unreliable or 
prejudicial evidence. 31 Unless the state's interest is weak, 
constitutional error will be found only if the excluded evidence 
is shown to be critical, reliable, and highly probative 
evidence. 32 
3° Colley v. Sumner, 784 F.2d 984, 990 (9th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 479 U.S. 839 (1986). 
31 Perry v. Rushen, 713 F.2d 1447, 1452-53 (9th Cir. 1983); 
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 838 (1984.). See Green v. Georgia, 442 
U.S. 95 (1979) (exclusion at capital sentencing proceeding of 
hearsay admission by accomplice that he had killed the victim 
after telling the defendant to run an errand violates due 
process, particularly because state used same testimony to secure 
death sentence against accomplice); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 
U.S. 284 (1973) (mechanistic application of procedural rule to 
bar defense cross-examination of witness who had confessed to 
crime with which defendant was charged, and exclusion as hearsay 
of testimony of three other witnesses to whom the first witness 
had confessed). See also Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 
4 (1986) (defendant at capital sentencing proceeding must be 
allowed to introduce any relevant mitigating evidence). 
32 Perry v. Rushen, 713 F.2d 1447, 1452 (9th Cir. 1983); 
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 838 (1984). 
7 
B. Confrontation Clause 
The sixth amendment guarantees a defendant the right to 
confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him. This is a 
fundamental right of great importance. Confrontation clause 
issues typically arise in three situations: when hearsay 
statements by a non-testifying declarant are admitted against the 
defendant, when a non-testifying co-defendant's confession is 
admitted, and when the trial court restricts the defendant's 
cross-examination of a witness on an issue. 
1. Hearsay 
If a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination, 
the confrontation clause ordinarily requires the state to show 
that he is unavailable and that the statement bears adequate 
"indicia of reliability. 1133 Reliability may be inferred if the 
statement falls within "a firmly rooted" hearsay exception. 34 
These principles have been applied mainly to prevent introduction 
of prior testimony of an unavailable witness. 35 The statements 
of a co-conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy, whether 
technically hearsay or not, are binding on each member of the 
conspiracy and therefore are admissible against them, regardless 
of the unavailability of the declarant. 36 
33 
34 
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). 
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). 
35 See United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 391-93 (1986). 
The Inadi Court appears to limit the unavailability requirement 
of Roberts to prior testimony. Id. 
36 See United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 391-93 (1986). 
8 
2. Confession of non-testifying co-defendant 
It is error to allow the jury to hear the confession of a 
co-defendant that implicates the defendant unless the defendant 
has an opportunity to cross-examine the co-defendant. 37 This 
error, frequently referred to as Bruton error, is not cured by an 
instruction that the jury should not consider the confession 
against the implicated defendant, 38 or by the admission of the 
implicated defendant's own confession. 39 Error may be prevented, 
however, by redacting the confession to remove any reference to 
the existence of the non-confessing defendant. 40 
Again, relief will be denied if the state demonstrates that 
the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 41 If the 
implicated defendant has also confessed, his confession may be 
used in determining whether the error was harmless. 42 
37 Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 136 (1968) (out-
of-court confession of non-testifying co-defendant); Toolate v. 
Borg, 828 F.2d 571, 575 (9th Cir. 1987) (in-court confession but 




Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135-36 (1968). 
Cruz v. New York, 481 U.$. 186, 107 S. Ct. 1714, 1719 
40 Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 107 S. Ct. 1702, 1709 
(1987). The Supreme Court noted that merely removing the name of 
the non-confessing co-defendant may not be sufficient. Id., at 
1709 n.5. 
41 Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969} (error 
harmless where substantial evidence against non-confessing 
defendant plus opportunity to cross-examine one of three 
confessing co-defendants); Toolate v. Borg, 828 F.2d 571, 575 
(9th Cir. 1987) (error harmless where confession cumulative). 
42 
(1987). 
Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 107 S. ct. 1714, 1719 
9 
3. Trial court limitation of cross-examination 
The confrontation clause is violated when the trial court 
restricts the defendant's cross-examination of a witness to show 
a "prototypical form of bias. 1143 The harmless error test applies 
to such violations. 44 Relevant factors for determining whether 
the error was harmless include the significance of the witness's 
testimony, the presence or absence of corroborating or 
contradictory evidence, the extent of cross-examination 
permitted, and the strength of the prosecution's case. 45 
III. RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
The sixth amendment guarantees a criminal defendant's right 
to the effective assistance of counsel. 46 Most claims of 
ineffective assistance are based on facts that the trial court 
could not observe or inquire into. 47 There is little that the 
trial court can do to prevent such claims. In extreme cases, the 
trial court may observe evidence of ineffectiveness, as where 
counsel is asleep during the trial or fails to appear; in such 
43 Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680 (1986) 
(prohibition of cross-examination about agreement with 
prosecution to drop a criminal charge in return for cooperation). 
But see Evans v. Lewis, 855 F.2d 631, 634 (9th Cir. 1988) (no 
confrontation clause violation when cross-examination about 
immunity agreement would have been cumulative). 
44 Delaware v._Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986). 
45 Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986). 
46 See, e.g. ' Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-
86 (1984). 
47 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689-91 
(1984) (for example, inquiry into counsel's conversations with 
the defendant may be critical to an evaluation of effectiveness). 
10 
cases, the court should take prompt action. The more common 
situations requiring trial court action are conflicts of interest 
and defendants seeking to proceed prose. 
A. Counsel with conflicts of interest 
The right to effective assistance of counsel includes a 
right to counsel free from conflicts of interest. 48 Existence of 
a conflict of interest that adversely affected the attorney's 
representation of the defendant can amount to constitutional 
error.w 
If the trial court has reason to suspect that a defendant's 
counsel has a conflict of interest, the court should hold a 
hearing. 5° Conflicts may arise when the same attorney represents 
more than one defendant in the case before the court or in a 
related matter, 51 when the attorney's own interests conflict with 
the defendant's interests, 52 or when the attorney is hired by 
48 ~' Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 481 (1978). 
49 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984); 
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348-49 (1980). 
50 See Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 272 (1981). 
51 
~' Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980) 
(successive representation; three defendants represented at 
separate trials by two attorneys and decisions at one trial may 
have been affected by considerations of impact on subsequent 
trials of other co-defendants); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 
475 (1978) (simultaneous representation; possibility that 
confidential information learned from co-defendants affected 
single counsel's ability to effectively represent three co-
defendants). 
52 
~' Mannhalt v. Reed, 847 F.2d 576 (9th Cir.) (in 
prosecution for receiving stolen goods, defendant's attorney 
alleged to have purchased stolen goods from defendant), cert. 
denied, 109 s. ct. 260 (1988). 
11 
another defendant53 or a third party who has an interest in the 
case. 54 
If the court finds that a conflict exists, it must appoint 
new counsel to represent the defendant unless the defendant 
effectively waives the conflict. Like all waivers of 
constitutional rights, a waiver of conflict must be voluntary and 
intelligent and on the record. 55 If the court finds that the 
conflict or potential conflict is sufficiently serious, it may 
decline to accept a waiver, 56 although doing so may create 
another problem by violating the defendant's qualified right to 
choose his attorney. When the trial court declines to accept a 
waiver, it should make findings on the record explaining why the 
state interest in ensuring that the judgment will withstand 
appeal should prevail over the defendant's qualified right. 57 
B. Conflicts between defendant and counsel 
Compelling a defendant to stand trial represented by an 
attorney with whom he has an irreconcilable conflict may violate 
53 Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980). 
54 
~, Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261 (1981) (owner of 
adult theatre and bookstore hired attorney to defend three 
employees charged with distributing obscene materials; attorney 
pressed broad constitutional attack and did not argue for 
leniency for the individual defendants). 
55 Mannhalt v. Reed, 847 F.2d 576, 580 (9th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 109 S. Ct. 260 (1988). 
56 Wheat v. United States, 108 s. ct. 1692, 1699-1700 
(1988) (trial court was within its discretion in refusing a 
waiver of conflict of interest where one co-defendant sought to 
retain the same counsel as another co-defendant who was a 
probable prosecution witness at the first co-defendant's trial). 
57 See Wheat v. United states, 108 s. ct. 1692, 1701 (1988) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting). 
12 
the defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel. 58 When a 
defendant requests substitute counsel, the trial court should 
consider the following three factors in determining whether the 
conflict requires granting the request: (1) whether the 
defendant's request is timely; (2) whether it is supported by 
reasons; and (3) whether the conflict between the defendant and 
his attorney has resulted in such a lack of communication as to 
prevent an adequate defense. 59 
The timeliness of a motion for substitution of counsel 
depends on when the motion is made, any reasons for delay, and 
the need for a continuance of the trial if the motion were 
granted. If the defendant's motion for substitution of counsel 
is made immediately before or during trial and the defendant has 
not articulated reasons for the delay, denial of the motion is 
justified if substitution would require a continuance. 60 In 
contrast, a motion made at a pretrial appearance is timely, and 
late consideration of the motion for reasons not attributable to 
58 Hudson v. Rushen, 686 F.2d 826, 829 (9th Cir. 1982), 
cert. denied, 461 U.S. 916 (1983). 
59 Hudson v. Rushen, 686 F.2d 826, 829 (9th Cir. 1982), 
cert. denied, 461 U.S. 916 (1983). 
60 United States v. Gonzalez, 800 F.2d 895, 898-99 (9th 
Cir. 1986) (motion made on second day of trial); United States v. 
Mcclendon, 782 F.2d 785, 789 (9th Cir. 1986) (motion made on 
first day of trial); United States v. Rogers, 769 F.2d 1418, 1423 
(9th Cir. 1985) (motion made on morning of trial untimely where 
defendant could have informed court of dissatisfaction with 
counsel during the five weeks between arraignment and trial); 
Hudson v. Rushen, 686 F.2d 826, 831 (9th Cir. 1982) (granting 
motion made at close of prosecution's case would have required 
continuance or mistrial), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 916 (1983); 
United States v. Mills, 597 F.2d 693, 700 (9th Cir. 1979) (motion 
made one week before trial was untimely). 
13 
the defendant will not render the motion untimely. 61 
In considering the defendant's reasons for his 
dissatisfaction with counsel, the court should hold a hearing at 
which the defendant has the opportunity to state specific reasons 
for his dissatisfaction with counsel.~ The ''court must take the 
time to conduct such necessary inquiry as might ease the 
defendant's dissatisfaction, distrust, and concern.''~ The 
court, however, need not ask specific questions regarding the 
defendant's reasons for his dissatisfaction if the court has 
sufficient information to make a decision.~ Likewise, the court 
need not interrogate the defendant or his counsel about their 
confidential communications. 65 
The reasons typically stated by defendants for their 
dissatisfaction with counsel are insufficient in themselves to 
61 Chavez v. Pulley, 623 F. Supp. 672, 687 (E.D. Cal. 
1985) . 
62 United States v. Gonzalez, 800 F.2d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 
1986). This hearing is substantially equivalent to the 
California requirement, set forth in People v. Marsden, 2 Cal. 3d 
118, 123-24, 84 Cal. Rptr. 156, 465 P.2d 44 (1970), that the 
court permit the defendant to specify his reasons for requesting 
new counsel. Hudson v. Rushen, 686 F.2d 826, 829 (9th Cir. 
1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 916 (1983). 
63 Hudson v. Rushen, 686 F.2d 826, 829 (9th Cir. 1982), 
cert. denied, 461 U.S. 916 (1983). If the court's interrogation 
reveals that the defendant's counsel has taken a position adverse 
to the defendant, by appearing uncooperative or hostile toward 
the defendant, then the court must appoint new counsel for the 
defendant for the purpose of the hearing; otherwise, the 
defendant would improperly be deprived of counsel at the hearing. 
United States v. Wadsworth, 830 F.2d 1500, 1510 (9th Cir. 1987). 
~ ~, United States v. Mcclendon, 782 F.2d 785, 789 (9th 
Cir. 1986) (counsel vigorous and well prepared). 
65 
1985) . 
United States v. Rogers, 769 F.2d 1418, 1424 (9th Cir. 
14 
require substitution of counsel. Disagreement with counsel's 
recommendation to plead guilty does not require replacement of 
counsel if the recommendation was within the reasonable range of 
competence.~ Likewise, unless there is a total breakdown in 
communication, a defendant's disagreement with counsel's trial 
strategy does not require substitution of counsel. 67 The 
defendant's assertion that counsel is not adequately prepared 
does not require substitution unless the conflict has resulted in 
a total breakdown in communication or the court finds that 
counsel has not prepared an adequate defense.~ Finally, 
antagonism between the defendant and his counsel does not require 
substitution of counsel unless the hostility has prevented 
counsel from preparing a defense. 69 
In determining whether there is a total lack of 
communication, the court should focus on the effect of a 
breakdown in communication on counsel's ability to prepare a 
defense. If the conflict between defendant and his counsel does 
not result in such a loss of communication that counsel is unable 
to adequately prepare a defense, then the court need not grant 
~ 
1985). 
United States v. Rogers, 769 F.2d 1418, 1424 (9th Cir. 
67 United States v. Wadsworth, 830 F.2d 1500, 1509-10 (9th 
Cir. 1987). 
~ United States v. Wadsworth, 830 F.2d 1500, 1510 (9th 
Cir. 1987); United States v. Mills, 597 F.2d 693, 700 (9th Cir. 
1979). -
69 United States v. Wadsworth, 830 F.2d 1500, 1510 (9th 
Cir. 1987); Chavez v. Pulley, 623 F. Supp. 672, 688 (E.D. Cal. 
1985) • 
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the motion to substitute counsel. 70 Even a complete lack of 
communication may not require substitution if counsel is able to 
prepare and competently represent the defendant at trial. 71 In 
contrast, if the lack of communication is so complete that the 
attorney cannot prepare a defense, substitute counsel must be 
appointed even if the failure to cooperate stems from the 
defendant's refusal to cooperate.n 
C. Waiver of the right to counsel 
A criminal defendant has a qualified right to waive counsel 
and proceed prose.TI If the defendant's waiver of the right to 
counsel is voluntary and intelligent,~ if he is competent to 
represent himself, 75 and if his motion to represent himself is 
timely,~ then the trial court must grant his request. 
When the defendant indicates his desire to represent himself 
the trial court should make a record establishing that the 
defendant is aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation to establish that waiver of the right to counsel 
70 United States v. Gonzalez, 800 F.2d 895, 898-99 (9th 
Cir. 1986). 
71 Barnes v. Housewright, 603 F. Supp. 330, 332 (D. Nev. 
1985), aff'd mem., 785 F.2d 314 (9th Cir. 1986). 
n Brown v. Craven, 424 F.2d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 1970). 
TI Faretta v. Cal_ifornia, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975). 
74 See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975). 
75 See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975). 
76 See Fritz v. Spalding, 682 F.2d 782, 784 (9th Cir. 1982) 
(motion timely if made before jury empaneled unless trial court 
makes factual finding that purpose of motion is to gain delay). 
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is voluntary and intelligent.n 
The court should also question the defendant to determine 
whether he is competent to represent himself. Competency does 
not depend on technical legal knowledge as such, but on the 
defendant's ability to present his case to the trier of fact. 78 
If the defendant wishes to proceed prose, the court may 
appoint, over the defendant's objection, standby counsel to aid 
the defendant when he requests help and to be available to 
represent the defendant if the defendant turns out to be 
incompetent to represent himself. 79 However, the defendant is 
entitled to control of the case and it may be constitutional 
error if the actions of the standby counsel destroy the jury's 
perception that the defendant is in control of his defense. 80 
IV. JURY CHARGE 
Federal habeas corpus relief may be given where error in the 
jury charge is so prejudicial as to have infected the entire 
trial, rendering it ''fundamentally unfair," thereby violating due 
n Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975). 
Explanation of these dangers and disadvantages on the record is 
not constitutionally required in the Ninth Circuit. United 
States v. Kimmel, 672 F.2d 720, 722 (9th Cir. 1982); but see 
McDowell v. United States, 108 s. Ct. 478 (1987) (White, J., 
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (arguing that the supreme 
Court should resolve conflict between circuits whether trial 




Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835-36 (1975). 
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 n.46 (1975). 
McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 178 (1984). 
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process. 81 A challenge claiming error under state law only does 
not state a claim cognizable in federal habeas corpus 
proceedings. 82 Nor does one on the ground that the instructions 
are "undesirable, erroneous, or even 'universally condemned. 11183 
The federal court will evaluate the effect of the allegedly 
erroneous instruction or of the allegedly erroneous failure to 
give an instruction in the context of the record as a whole, 
including the entire charge to the jury, and compare the 
instructions given with those that should have been given.M 
The trial court must instruct the jury on all of the 
elements of each offense charged. Failure to do so violates due 
process because a defendant may be convicted only upon proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt of every element of the crime with 
which he is charged. 85 For that reason, due process also bars 
evidentiary presumptions in a jury charge that would allow the 
jury to infer one element from proof of another element, such as 
an instruction that allows the jury to infer malice from the use 
of a deadly weapon.M 
Due process requires the court to instruct the jury on the 








Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146-47 (1973). 
Willard v. California, 812 F.2d 461, 463 (9th Cir. 
Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146-47 (1973). 
Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977). 
In re Winship. 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 
Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 313 (1985). 
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the law and the evidence. 87 However, refusal to give such an 
instruction does not alone render the trial fundamentally 
unfair,M and omission of an instruction is less likely to be 
prejudicial than a misstatement of the law. 89 
Even if there is constitutional error in the jury charge, it 
will not be ground for relief if it was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 90 An error is harmless if "the facts found by 
the jury were such that [if the error had not occurred] its 
verdict would have been the same. 1191 Examples of error that were 
found to be harmless include 
* failure to instruct the jury on a necessary element of 
the crime charged if that element is not disputed92 or if 
the arguments of counsel adequately define that element 
and make clear to the jury that it must be proved; 93 and 
* an instruction that may be understood by the jury to 
allow it to infer a necessary element when that 
instruction is followed by a clear statement that the 
state is required to prove all elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt94 or when the evidence of that element 
87 United States v. Tsinnijinne, 601 F.2d 1035, 1040 (9th 




Dunckhurst v. Deeds, 859 F.2d 110, 114 (9th Cir. 1988). 
Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 155 (1977). 
Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 583 (1986). 
91 Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 107 S. Ct. 1918, 1922 
n. 6 (1987). 
92 
~, Darnell v. Swinney, 823 F.2d 299, 301 (9th Cir. 
1987) ("deficiencies in the instructions went to matters that 
were not in dispute"), cert. denied, 108 s. ct. 1012 (1988). 
93 Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 153-54 (1977). 
94 Knaubert v. Goldsmith, 791 F.2d 722, 725-26 (9th Cir.) 
(inference of sanity), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 867 (1986). 
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is overwhelming. 95 
The only recent reported examples of reversible error 
arising in the Ninth Circuit are 
* the trial court's failure, in a capital case, to instruct 
sua sponte on second degree murder when the evidence 
would support such a lesser included charge: 96 and 
* instruction on a charge if the indictment or information 
does not provide the defendant with notice adequate to 
prepare a defense against that charge. 97 
Thus, jury instructions that are reasonably clear, that 
state each element of the charged offenses, and that clearly 
place on the prosecution the burden of proving each element 
beyond a reasonable doubt will pass constitutional muster. To 
this end the trial court should be careful to identify the 
disputed material issues and to instruct on those issues. 
V. EXPOSURE OF JURORS TO EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE 
Exposure of the jury to extrinsic evidence violates the 
defendant's sixth amendment confrontation right unless the state 
proves that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 98 If the 
extrinsic evidence relates directly to a material aspect of the 
95 
~, McKenzie v. Risley, 842 F.2d 1525, 1530-31 (9th 
Cir.) (en bane) (inference of intent), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 
250 (1988). 
96 Vickers v. Ricketts, 798 F.2d 369, 372-73 (9th Cir. 
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1054 (1987). 
97 Givens v. Housewright, 786 F.2d 1378, 1381 (9th Cir. 
1986) (reversible error to instruct on murder by torture when 
only notice in information was citation to statute that includes 
murder by torture as one type of aggravated murder but does not 
indicate that murder by torture need not be premeditated). 
98 Dickson v. Sullivan, 849 F.2d 403, 405 (9th Cir. 1988). 
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case and a rational connection can be drawn between the extrinsic 
evidence and a prejudicial jury finding, then a writ will be 
granted, even if the connection is improbable.w 
The trial court can take steps prior to exposure and after 
it learns of the exposure to reduce the risk of error. The court 
should admonish the jury regularly that it should not consider 
any evidence except that which is admitted by the court. 100 The 
court can also ensure that extrinsic evidence, such as court 
files, 101 reference books, 102 or magazines, 103 is excluded from the 
jury room. 
w fu.fh, Dickson v. Sullivan, 849 F.2d 403, 405-08 (9th 
Cir. 1988). 
100 See United States v. Bagnariol, 
1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 962 (1982} 
consider only evidence produced at trial 
in denying habeas relief). 
665 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 
(daily instruction to 
cited by reviewing court 
101 See United States v. Vasguez, 597 F.2d 192 (9th Cir. 
1979) (new trial required because jurors may have seen 
inadmissible evidence of prior convictions, rejected jury 
instructions, and other documents in court file left in jury room 
for four hours) • 
102 See Marino v. Vasguez, 812 F.2d 499 (9th Cir. 1987) (new 
trial required partly because jury considered dictionary 
definition of malice); Gibson v. Clanon, 633 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1035 (1981) (new trial required 
where jurors consulted medical encyclopedia to determine rarity 
of defendant's blood type which matched blood found on weapon, 
after judge had earlier ruled such evidence inadmissible). 
103 See United States v. Littlefield, 752 F.2d 1429 (9th 
Cir. 1985) (new trial -required in prosecution for tax fraud where 
jurors read and discussed magazine article discussing similar 
fraudulent tax shelters, describing them as growing national 
concern, and decrying light sentences imposed for convictions); 
but see United States v. Brodie, 858 F.2d 492 (9th Cir. 1988) (no 
new trial in prosecution for failure to file tax returns where 
booklets advocating tax resistance received by two jurors who 
were removed, other jurors did not read booklets, and no direct 
and rational connection between general booklets and specific 
case). 
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If the court learns that the jury has been exposed to 
extrinsic evidence, it should conduct an evidentiary hearing 
(ordinarily through individual voir dire of each affected juror) 
to determine what extrinsic evidence the jury was exposed to, 
which jurors were exposed, how the jury was exposed to the 
evidence, whether and to what extent the jury discussed the 
evidence, whether the evidence was introduced before a verdict 
was reached, and anything else that may bear on whether the 
exposure affected the verdict. 104 The court should determine 
whether the extrinsic evidence relates directly to a material 
aspect of the case and, if so, whether a rational connection can 
be drawn between the extrinsic evidence and a prejudicial jury 
finding. If the jury has not yet reached a verdict, the trial 
court should consider whether the problem can be solved by 
removal of tainted jurors and a curative instruction to consider 
only the evidence that the court admitted. 105 A ruling by the 
trial court following procedures such as have been described is 
likely to avoid constitutional error. 
104 See Dickson v. Sullivan, 849 F.2d 403, 406 (9th Cir. 
1988); see also United States v. Bagnariol, 665 F.2d 877, 885 
(9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 962 (1982) (evidentiary 
hearing is factor to consider in deciding whether new trial 
required). 
105 See Bayramoglu v. Estelle, 806 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1986) 
(no new trial required where jury divided between first and 
second degree murder, one juror researched penalties and told 
rest of jury, but jury only discussed it for one to two minutes, 
the tainted juror was removed, a curative instruction was given, 
and new jury returned verdict of second degree murder); but see 
Dickson v. Sullivan, 849 F.2d 403, 408 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(instruction to ignore evidence of prior convictions ineffective, 
especially if defendant does not have an opportunity to rebut). 
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VI. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 
A. Effect of Misconduct 
Prosecutorial misconduct violates the defendant's due 
process rights if, in the context of the entire proceedings, it 
renders the trial "fundamentally unfair. 11106 Misconduct may also 
violate the defendant's fifth amendment right against self-
incrimination or his sixth amendment right to counsel. If one of 
the defendant's constitutional rights is violated the state has 
the burden of demonstrating that the misconduct was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 1~ 
The most important factor in determining the prejudicial 
effect of prosecutorial misconduct is whether the trial court 
issued a curative instruction. The jury normally is presumed to 
disregard inadmissible evidence when instructed to do so unless 
there is an "overwhelming probability" that it would be unable to 
do so and there is a strong likelihood that the effect of the 
misconduct would be "devastating" to the defendant. 108 
Other factors affecting the prejudicial effect of 
prosecutorial misconduct include whether it was invited by 
106 See Darden v. Wainwright, 4 77 U.S. 168, 181 ( 1986) ; 
Donnelley v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 645 (1974). 
107 See United States v. Hasting, 4 61 U.S. 499, 509-510 
(1983) (overwhelming evidence of guilt makes misconduct harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt). 
108 Greer v. Miller, 107 s. ct. 3102, 3109 n.8 (1987) (no 
due process violation from improper questioning on why the 
defendant remained silent after arrest when trial court sustained 
objection to question and instructed jury to ignore it). 
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inappropriate comments by the defense, 109 whether a comment 
manipulates or misstates the evidence, 110 the weight of the 
evidence against the defendant, 111 whether the misconduct is an 
isolated incident or part of an ongoing pattern of misconduct, 112 
and whether the misconduct relates to a critical part of the 
case. 113 
B. Forms of Misconduct 
Prosecutorial misconduct can take many forms, but may be 
divided into two main classes: misconduct in the courtroom, 
which the trial court can recognize and correct, and misconduct 
outside the courtroom, of which the trial court cannot know 
unless it is brought to the court's attention. 
1. Misconduct in the courtroom 
Prosecutorial misconduct in the courtroom typically takes 
the form of inappropriate comments, frequently in the summation. 
109 United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 13 (1985) (defense 
misconduct does not excuse prosecutorial misconduct but is 
relevant for determining prejudicial effect of prosecutorial 
misconduct); see also United states v. Robinson, 108 s. Ct. 864, 
869 (1988) (prosecutor's remark in summation that defendant could 
have testified does not violate fifth amendment after defense 
summation argued that government had not given defendant an 
opportunity to explain his side of the story). 
110 See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 182 (1986). 
111 Compare United states v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 19 (1985) 
("overwhelming" evidence of guilt) with United States v. Schuler, 
813 F.2d 978, 982 (9th Cir. 1987) (in light of prior hung jury, 
new trial required because of prosecutor's reference to 
defendant's courtroom demeanor, without curative instruction). 
112 See Lincoln v. Sunn, 807 F.2d 805, 809 (9th Cir. 1987). 
113 See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1970) 
(failure to disclose information showing potential bias of 
witness especially significant because government's case rested 
on credibility of that witness). 
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~. 
The prosecutor may not make comments that express personal 
opinions on the credibility of witnesses, 114 the weight of the 
evidence, 115 or the guilt of the defendant, 116 or that implicate a 
specific constitutional right of the defendant such as the right 
against compulsory self incrimination117 or the right to 
counsel. 118 
Misconduct that implicates the defendant's right against 
compulsory self incrimination takes two basic forms: questioning 
the defendant about his prior silence, and commenting, in the 
summation, on the defendant's failure to testify. If the 
defendant chooses to testify, the prosecutor may not cross-
examine him on why he did not tell his story to the police after 
he received Miranda warnings. 119 However, the prosecutor may 
cross-examine the defendant on why he did not tell his story to 
the police prior to his arrest1~ or after his arrest but before 
114 
1985) • 
United States v. McKay, 771 F.2d 1207, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 




See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 19 (1985). 
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965). 
118 See Bruno v. Rushen, 721 F. 2d 1193, 1194-95 ( 9th Cir. 
1983) (suggestion that jury may infer guilt from fact that 
defendant hired an attorney), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 920 (1984). 
119 See Greer v. Miller, 107 s. ct. 3102, 3107-08 (1987) 
(such questioning violates state's promise, implied in Miranda 
warnings, that silence would not be used against defendant; no 
due process violation, however, when objection to question 
sustained and jury instructed not to draw any inference of guilt 
from the defendant's post-warning silence). 
120 Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980). 
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he was warned. 121 
The prosecutor may not directly call attention to the 
defendant's failure to testify or make a comment that the jury 
naturally would take as a comment on the defendant's failure to 
testify. 122 However, when the defendant advances his own theory 
of the case, the prosecutor may comment on the failure of the 
defense to produce evidence or witnesses supporting that 
theory. 123 
2. Misconduct outside the courtroom 
Misconduct outside the courtroom can take several forms. 
The most significant is failure of the prosecution to furnish 
information to the defendant. If the defense makes a specific 
formal request for such information, then the prosecutor must 
turn over any evidence that is material to the guilt or innocence 
of the defendant or to punishment. 1~ If the defense does not 
make such a request, then the prosecutor must turn over any 
evidence that might create a reasonable doubt that otherwise 
would not exist. 125 
121 Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982). 
122 See Lincoln v. Sunn, 807 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1987) 
(misconduct to comment four times that only one person other than 
the prosecution's witness could know anything about conversations 
between that witness and the defendant). 
,n United States v. Bagley, 772 F.2d 482, 494 (9th Cir. 
1985) (not misconduct to respond to defense summation by asking 
"where would that evidence [supporting the defense theory of the 
case] be, wouldn't it be presented to you?"), cert. denied, 475 
U.S. 1023 (1986). 
124 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
125 United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (if the 
case is close then minor evidence may meet this requirement). 
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C. Dealing with Misconduct 
Because the trial court is in the best position to weigh the 
prejudicial effect of the misconduct and to decide whether a 
curative instruction would be effective, 126 it is important for it 
to do so, whether or not the defendant objects. 127 If the court 
decides that a curative instruction would be effective, it should 
give one, such as an instruction that the arguments of counsel 
are not evidence, or that the jury should not draw an inference 
of guilt from the defendant's failure to testify, or even that a 
particular action of the prosecutor was inappropriate and that 
the jury should disregard it. If the court determines that a 
curative instruction would not be sufficient to render the trial 
fair, it should declare a mistrial. 
January 1989 William W Schwarzer 
Jon Bernhardt 
Marie Louise Caro 
126 See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 339 (1985). 
127 But see Nevius v. Sumner, 852 F.2d 463, 470 (9th Cir. 
1988) (court suggests that, if prejudicial effect of misconduct 
could have been cured by instruction, and if defendant did not 
request such an instruction, then the defendant cannot claim 
misconduct as a ground for federal habeas corpus relief). 
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SUPREME COUl-{T OF IDAHO 
AN 2 3 1989 
(1_4_ lftrt- 1-J-c 
ROBERT C. HUNTLEY. JR. 
JUSTICE January 18, 1989 
Professor Albert M. Pearson 
School of Law 
University of Georgia 
Athens, Georgia 30602 
Dear Professor Pearson: 
---- 451 W. STATE STREET BOISE. IDAHO 83720 (208) 334-3464 
Under letter dated January 5, 1989, Justice Powell suggested 
I communicate directly to you relative to my interest in expediting 
the processing of capital sentencing cases. My focus is on an area 
that few others care to discuss and, that is, the fact that my 
experience and data convinces me that a substantial portion of the 
delay is simply due to lack of basic calendar management by judges 
themselves. Not only do individual judges fail to monitor and move 
their cases along, but more importantly, with respect to the 
federal district courts and the federal circuit courts, they have 
failed to institutionalize those procedures which would result in 
proper case flow. 
THE IDAHO EXPERIENCE 
Enclosed hereto as Appendix A to this letter is a copy of my 
letter of August 24, 1988, to the Honorable Alfred T. Goodwin, 
Chief Circuit Judge of the Ninth Circuit. It details a number of 
the management problems I have identified and has as an attachment 
thereto our Attorney General's summary of the process of three 
Idaho cases. 
THE MONTANA EXPERIENCE 
I now have received a document explaining the time line of 
five Montana cases from a Justice of the Montana Supreme Court, 
compiled by Montana's Attorney General and the lack of simple basic 
calendar management is even more shocking than obtains in the Idaho 
cases. Let me comment on just a few examples. 
Coleman v. McCormick: 
( 1) Twenty months for the district court to get to oral 
argument on cross motions for summary judgment. (I have tried many 
summary judgment cases in complex civil litigation and find that 
time lapse ridiculous except in the most complex of cases.) 
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(3) After oral argument in the Ninth Circuit, one full year 
before the court orders supplemental briefing. 
(4) Nineteen months from oral argument to decision. 
(5) Five months to order rehearing. 
McKenzie v. Risley: 
(1) The document shows most of the state court proceedings 
were done in one year and usually the decisions were rendered 
within three months. 
(2) Took fourteen months to get to hearing on first petition 
in district court. 
(3) Took nineteen months to decide following the hearing. 
(4) Took thirteen months to decide two remaining claims. 
(5) When it reached the Ninth Circuit, it took the Circuit 
five months to decide to grant an en bane hearing and the en bane 
process took about one year on the first appeal. 
(6) In a second petition for habeas at the district court 
level, a summary judgment was granted and a notice of appeal to 
the Circuit was filed. Nothing happened for fifteen months 
relative to getting a certificate of probable cause issued, until 
the attorney general wrote a letter inquiring as to which crack the 
case had fallen into. Who was monitoring this case at that time? 
Smith v. Risley: 
(1) Federal District Court took twenty-one months to process 
a summary judgment. 
State v. Fitzpatrick: 
(1) Note the bracketed material on the enclosure. It took: 
(a) Sixteen months to get a summary judgment to oral 
argument and then two years to decide it, and a 
total of three years and six months to process a 
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(2) When the case was appealed to the Ninth Circuit, it took 
one year and nine months to bring it to oral argument. 
CONCLUSION 
Someone needs to focus on calendar management techniques. 
Procedures and rules need to be institutionalized which will make 
the cases automatically flow. It is __ fa~~ the problem 
on habeas corpus legislation, which of course may be some substan-
tial part of the problem, but I think the real problem is lack of 
judicial focus on calendar management. ---------- Respectfully submitted, 
~ c_ J_/4 A~~ 
Robert C. Huntrer., -v;;✓ -
Enc. 
cc: Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
- -
jltltttntt~anrlaf~t~nitthjtattg 
Jfuftmghtn. ~- (4. 2.ngr~, 
CHAMBERS OF 
..JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, ..JR. 
RETIRED 
January 5, 1989 
Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas 
Dear Judge Huntley: 
A brief note to thank you for your telephone call. 
Although our specific mission is to consider causes of delay 
attributable to repetitive habeas corpus review, your inves-
tigation and study of administrative delay - often due to 
negligence or incompetency - certainly would be of interest. 
The Committee would be happy to receive a copy of your in-
vestigation. 
It would be helpful if you also sent a copy direct-
ly to our Reporter, Professor Albert M. Pearson, School of 
Law, University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia 30602. Profes-
sor Pearson is working with the offices of the state attor-
neys general in the Fifth and Eleventh Federal Circuits. 
Our Committee meets again on January 30. 
I mentioned that the American Bar Association also 
has a study underway. The Chairman is Judge Alvin B. Rubin, 
2440 One American Place, Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70825, an 
able member of the Fifth Circuit Federal Court of Appeals. 
Sincerely, 
Hon. Robert G. Huntley, -Jr. 
Supreme Court of Idaho 
Supreme Court Building 
451 West State Street 
Boise, Idaho 83720 
lfp/ss 
i._~(f~ 
cc: Professor Albert M. Pearson 
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Robert C . Grisham 
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Justice Robert Huntley of the Idaho Supreme Court has 
become interested in delays in judicial process in major felony 
cases in general and capital punishment cases in particular. 
Many of the delays that have come to his attention 
involve nothing more - he tells me - than administrative laxity or 
indolence. He cites examples of extended delay because of respon-
sible administrators simply ignoring a pending proceeding and he 
i s interested in focusing on those situations. That is different 
from the matter of due process review or post conviction review of 
federal issues in federal courts following state court convic-
tions. The point he makes is an interesting one. 
Yesterday he spoke to Justice Lewis Powell about his 
interest in the point and Justice Powell recommended he get in 
touch with the ABA in order to volunteer for service on a germane 
committee of the Association. Justice Powell particularly men-
tioned that the ABA has a committee in the field under the chair-
manship of Al Rubin of New Orleans and recommends to Justice 
Huntley that he volunteer to serve on that committee. 
Could you check, Harriet, and find out what committees 
we have working in this field and, in particular, if there is one 
chaired by Rubin? If you find such committees then it would be a 
matter of noting who the appointing authority is; for example, the 
Chairman of a Section, the Chairman of a Division or, in the case 
of an Association-wide entity, the President-Elect. With that 
information, I can advise Justice Huntley appropriately and com-
municate with whoever has the appointing authority for vacancies 
that may come up within the year. 
Thanks for your help. 
ECT/pm 
cc: The Honourable Robert c. Huntley 
, - SUPREME COURT OF IDAHO 
ROBERT C. HUNTLEY, JR. 
JUSTICE 
August 24, 1988 
Honorable Alfred T. Goodwin 
Chief Circuit Judge 
350 U.S. Court of Appeals Bldg. 
125 South Grand Avenue 
P.O. Box 91510 
Pasadena, CA 91109-1510 
Dear Chief Judge Goodwin: 
-
451 W. STATE STREET 
BOISE. IDAHD 83720 
(208) 334-3464 
This letter is to invite the attention of yourself, the other 
judges of the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court Justices in the 
Ninth Circuit area to my extreme concern about the unconscionable 
delay we seem to be having in getting capital cases through both 
the state and federal court systems. In this regard I am critical 
of both the state and federal judiciaries. I think that if 
retention of our jobs were dependent upon executives from other 
walks of life favorably evaluating the way we manage our respective 
court systems, most of us would be looking for work elsewhere or 
selling pencils on the street corner. 
At my request, the Idaho Attorney General's office has 
provided me with the history of the processing of three Idaho 
appeals once they left the Supreme Court of Idaho and reached the 
federal system. Enclosed is a copy of this narrative of the 
processing of these cases. 
As a supreme court justice, I have some appreciation of the 
problems and delays which are inherent in any judicial process. 
However, I feel that the extended delays of these capital cases are 
inexcusable and demonstrate a lack of focus, commitment and hands-
on management of the process by the judges. There are things that 
can be done to expedite these cases. For example, the Idaho 
Legislature and the Idaho Supreme Court have taken a major step 
forward by requiring that all issues that a criminal defendant 
might have be filed at one time within a forty-two day period 
following sentencing. Disposition by the trial court is mandated 
: inety days after the filing of a petition or motion. This results 
j ri a single appeal from the judgments and all post-judgment motions 
, ;. contrast to the old practice of a series of appeals on each 




As you can see from the three case studies of the progress of 
Creech, Paradis and Gibson, in the federal system, there are some 
serious problems, most of which could be resolved. The Creech case 
has been in the federal system two years and three months and has 
not yet been resolved. You will note that there has been frequent 
and substantial slippage in that case in the preparation and filing 
of transcripts and in the simple act of getting the record 
designated (in the Creech case there was only a fifteen minute 
hearing to designate). There was later unconscionable delay in 
getting the briefs filed. 
Note further, that although the federal district court found 
absolutely no error or specific grounds for appeal to the Ninth 
Circuit, a certificate of probable cause was granted. In short, 
al though the district court found no merit in the petitioner's 
assignments it certified probable cause without specifying any 
issue whatsoever wherein there was probable cause. Accordingly, 
counsel and the State of Idaho had to go to the expense of briefing 
and oral argument on all issues, regardless of their speciousness. 
The Paradis case took two years and four months from time of 
filing of the habeas to hearing in the Ninth Circuit. The district 
court again found all of the contentions of the defense to be 
without merit and, yet, granted a certificate of probable cause for 
the appeal. Again, the certificate of probable cause specified no 
issues and, therefore, did not limit the appeal process in any way. 
Another continuing problem is evidenced in Paradis where the 
Ninth Circuit clerk's office, apparently without intervention or 
supervision from any judge, granted ex parte motions and stays. 
It appears that in the Idaho capital cases motions are granted 
without service of the motions ever having first been accomplished 
on the Idaho Attorney General. 
In the Gibson case the habeas corpus petition was filed in 
June 1986 and has not come to trial in the federal court some two 
years and two months later, nor has any summary disposition of any 
kind occurred. 
The bottom line is that inordinate delays, whether they be in 
the state system or the federal system, result in a public "black 
eye" for all judges. Our criminal justice system enjoys very 
little public respect, largely because of the lack of timeliness 
of the justice we dispense. We have become a laughing-stock for 
those familiar with business management techniques. 
I have stated my case in rather plain language, without the 
use of tactful and high-sounding euphemism, and have done so 
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rectify this situation. Two conclude my comments in "truck-driver 
language," the proof of the pudding is before us without any 
necessity of detailed statistical analysis. I understand that of 
the several hundreds of capital cases in the Ninth Circuit area, 
not one single case has reached completion in recent years unless 
the defendant has withdrawn his appeal or stipulated to a 
resolution. 
PROPOSAL 
We have enough collective expertise so that no more "studying 
of the problem" should be necessary. I would offer the following 
suggestion for direct action by the federal and state judiciaries: 
That Chief Judge Goodwin convene a two day meeting on the 
problem attended by the following: 
(a) two or three Ninth Circuit Judges 
(b) one justice from each supreme court 
(c) a representative of the Attorney General's office of at 
least two states 
(d) experienced capital punishment case defenders from no more 
than three states 
(e) two or three federal district judges 
(f) a representative of the administrative office or clerk's 
office of the Ninth Circuit and one or two counterparts from state 
court systems 
The group should be charged with taking testimony over a 
period of no longer than two days. At the end of those hearings 
the group would issue specific proposals for submission to our 
respective court systems. There may be some things the gathering 
would decide require more study, but I think that there are many 
time-saving suggestions which could be immediately identified and 
implemented based upon the expertise of the group. 
Very truly yours, 
Robert C. Huntley, Jr. 
Original to All Ninth Circuit Judges 
cc: All Supreme Court Justices in Ninth Circuit Area 
Idaho Federal District Judges 
three 
- -
Our federal experience in capital litigation is limited to 
Creech v. Arave, USCA 86-3983, Paradis v. cases, 
Arave, USCA 87-4100, and Gibson v. Arave, 86-1213 (D.Ct. ). 
All three have been attended by substantial delays. 
Creech v. Arave 
The Idaho Supreme Court made final disposition of this case 
on December 31, 1985, when it denied Creech's petition for 
rehearing of the court's order denying post-conviction relief. 
Creech then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
in the federal district court. That court found that the record 
justified summary denial of relief in 
With respect to Creech's claim 
all but one particular. 
that mismanagement of 
prescription medication affected the voluntariness of his 
gui 1 ty plea, the court scheduled an evidenti ary hearing. The 
state arrived at the appointed time with its witnesses, but 
Creech came unprepared to present evidence. Defense counsel 
stated to the court that he had not understood the purpose of 
the hearing and claimed that he had no funds to produce 
evidence. The district court then denied all relief. 
In July of 1986 Creech filed a notice of appeal. Despite 
the district court's earlier finding that only one issue had any 
possible merit, and his subsequent denial of relief on all 
issues, the court nonetheless granted a certificate of probable 
cause, but without specifying any appealable issue. The 
district court refused to stay execution. 
-1-
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On July 24, 1986, the United States Court of Appeals stayed 
the execution. Creech's motion for a stay and supporting 
documents were not served on the state. 
The state, in anticipation of the appeal, had filed motions 
to vacate the certificate of probable cause. 
summarily denied. 
These motions were 
On November 6, 1986, the clerk of the court not~fied 
defense counsel that his designation of the 
transcript was long (several months) overdue. 
reporter's 
Since the 
transcript applied only to the brief hearing before the district 
court, it presented no complication whatever. On November 10, 
1986, the state moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of 
prosecution. 
On December 1, 1986, the Court of Appeals ordered defense 
counsel to show cause within fourteen days why he should not be 
disciplined for failing to file his designation and why the 





later, on December 31, 1986, defense 
that accounted 
the time consumed. (His designation 
for only a portion of 
of record was filed 
December 22, 1986.) 
On March 2, 1986, two months later, the court reprimanded 
defense counsel, but denied the state's motion to dismiss the 
appeal. Appellant's brief became due April 20, 1987. 
On the day his brief was due, defense counsel filed an 
emergency motion for the appointment of co-counsel and an 
emergency motion for an extension of time. 
-2-
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the court vacated its briefing schedule 
of the motion for the appointment of 
a month later the court granted the 
unopposed motion for appointment of co-counsel and appointed 
Cliff Gardner of San Francisco . 
the case. The court set July 27, 
appellant's opening brief. On 
Gardner effectively took over 
1987, as the date for filing 
the day this brief was due, 
July 27 , the state received Gardner ' s motion for an order 
extending the due date of his brief , citing among other things a 
need to take his annual vacation. On August 13, 1987, the court 
extended Gardner's due date until October 15 , 1987 . 
On October 19, 1987, more than fifteen months after the 
appeal was filed, the state received Creech's opening brief and 
a motion to file an overlength brief. The motion to file a n 
overlength brief was denied on October 26, 1987. On 
November 6, 1987, the state received Creech' s motion for panel 
reconsideration of the order denying permission to file an 
over length brief. On November 13, 1987, we received an order 
granting permission. 
The state's brief was filed December 15, 1987, 
receiving a one-day extension of time. 




Paradis v. Arave 
The Idaho Supreme Court's final disposition of this case 
occurred on April 30, 1986, when the court denied rehearing of 
its decision denying post-conviction relief. That disposition, 
in turn, had been delayed when Paradis attempted to take a 
direct appeal to the U. S. Supreme Court from the Idaho Supreme 
Court's decision of February, 1984, upholding his conviction. 
The habeas case was filed in federal district court on 
June 9, 1986. The U. S. District Court allowed extensive 
discovery and then conducted an evidentiary hearing that took as 
much time as it took to receive evidence at the original trial. 
The district court found that Paradis' federal claims were 
wholly without merit, and denied his habeas petition on July 30, 
1987. The district court nonetheless granted a certificate of 
probable cause without identifying any arguably meritorious 
appeal issues. 
Notice of appeal was filed August 11, 1987. 
A further problem in this case is that a stay of execution 
was granted without notice to the state. The clerk's office at 
the Ninth Circuit refused to acknowledge any problem with 
granting an ex 
of calling to 
this procedure. 
parte stay and was uncooperative in the matter 
the court's attention the state's objection to 
A motions judge has also granted the defense application 
to supplement the record with portions of the transcript of the 




Appellant's brief was filed March 31, 1988. The state's 
brief was filed April 29, 1988. Heard August 4, 1988. 
Gibson v. Arave 
The petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this case was 
filed on June 19, 1986, almost contemporaneously with the 
Paradis petition. Nonetheless, the case is still in the U. S. 
District Court on unresolved motions relating to an evidentiary 
hearing. 
Extensive discovery has been allowed, and numerous 
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COLEMAN V. McCORMICK 
The-Montana Supreme Court's final disposition of the 
appeal of this case was on December 19, 1979, and the United 
States Supreme Court declined to review certain alleged 
errors on May 27, 1980. State v. Coleman, 185 Mont. 299, 605 
P.2d 1000 (1979), cert. denied,446 U.S. 970 (1970). 
In the meantime, Coleman sought review in the Sentence 
Review Division of the Montana Supreme Court and was refused. 
The Montana Supreme Court denied supervisory control in an 
order dated March 21, 1980, prompting the filing of a second 
petition for writ of certiorari before the United States 
Supreme Court. Certiorari was denied on the second petition 
on October 6, 19 8 0. Coleman v. Sentence Review Di vision of 
the Supreme Court of Montana-,- cert. denied, 4 4 9 U.S. 893 
(1980). 
On December 12, 1980, Coleman filed a petition for post-
conviction relief in the state district court, raising 52 
separate claims for relief. Following oral argument and 
submission of proposed findings and conclusions, the court 
granted the State's motion to dismiss on February 18, 1981. 
Coleman appealed the dismissal of his petition for post-
conviction relief to the Montana Supreme Court, which 
affirmed the district court .on August 28, 1981. The Supreme 
Court denied rehearing on September 28, 1981, and Coleman's 
third petition for a writ of certiorari was denied by the 
United States Supreme Court. Coleman v. State, 38 St. Rptr. 
1352, 633 P.2d 624 (1981), cert. denied-;-455 U.S. 983 (1982). 
On November 19, 1981, Coleman filed his petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court. 
On May 11, 1982, proceedings were stayed to allow Coleman to 
exhaust an issue in the state courts. Coleman filed a 
petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Montana Supreme 
Court on June 10, 19 8 2. The Court denied the petition on 
)
May 4, 1983. Coleman v. Risley, 40 St. Rptr. 418, 663 P.2d 
MO ---- -
· 1154 (1983). Coleman's federal habeas corpus action then 
Lproceeded, and oral argument on cross motions for swnmary 
judgment was heard on January 9, 1985. The district court,1 ~ 
in an order and memorandum opinion issued on August 8, 1985, )' r-N,. 
granted respondents' motion for summary judgment and denied 
Coleman's petition. 
Coleman appealed, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals_ 
heard oral argument on the issues on May 7, 1986. On May 6, 1 \ 
1987, the Court ordered supplemental briefing discussing the ( \..~~ 
applicability, if any, of the recent decisions of the United~ 
States Supreme Court in Mccleskey ~ Kemp, No. 84-6811, 55 
U.S.L.W. 4537 (April 22, 1987); Tison v. Arizona, No. 
84-6075, 55 U.S.L.W. 4496 (April 21, 1987) ;and Hitchcock v. 
Duqger, No. 85-6756, 55 U.S.L.W. 4567 (April 22, 1987). 
- -
-~ rnc:,n+ri 5 .t' r o"' 
c('?~l "'-'2-9'-'-"'e."r The panel decision of . January 19 ~ 19_88, of the Nint1l -S m o,...+f-..s 
, . . Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's denial ,... or~ 
to c.\e.c.,s ,o" of Coleman's application for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 , r: h . 
U.S.C. § 2254. By order of the Court dated May 12, 1988,J e.o.r u 
rehearing en bane was granted. Subsequently, the Court set 
oral argumen~d requested briefs on the above-stated 
issues. Oral argument was heard by the Ninth Circuit Court 
o f Appeals on July 20, 1988. 
-2-
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McKenzie v. Risley (McCormick) 
I. STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS 
A. First Direct Appeal 
-
d)cde.- ~ w.✓:,,e_: ~'-Kffe-<.-, /77°"( 
(J 
McKenzie was sentenced on March 3, 1975. The record on appeal was 
filed June 30, 1975, pursuant to an order of the Montana Suprem~~ 
Court extending the time to do so. The Court granted McKenzie at ; 1 , ~ 
least four extensions of the time for filing his brief on appeal. < ~:- ~ 
The brief was finally filed on February 17, 1976. The State was \ 0 0-.:' 5 granted two extensions totalling 55 days and filed its brief on_,) J\. \ ~l 
May 17, 1976. McKenzie's Reply Brief was filed June 14, 1976. The 
case was argued September 3, 1976, and the Court issued its order: i mo~~~ 
affirming the conviction and sentence on November 12, 1976. Statei +o~e~io-
v. McKenzie, 171 Mont. 278, ~57 P.2d 1023 (1976). The Court 
granted McKenzie an extension until December 2, 1976, of the time 
in which to file a petition for rehearing. A petition was filed 
on that date. The Court ordered it stricken on December 14, 1976, · 
apparently sua sponte, and directed the appellant to file a . 
corrected petition within 15 days. A second petition was filed ~~t\o~ 
December 28, 1976, and the Court entered its order denying ,~ o n.us 
rehearing on January 10, 1977. 
McKenzie filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the United 
States Supreme Court on May 10, 1977. On June 27, 1977, the Court 
entered its order granting certiorari and remanding the case to 
the Montana Supreme Court for further consideration in light of 
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977). McKenzie v. Montana, 
433 U.S. 905 (1977). 
B. Second Direct Appeal 
On August 8, 1977, the Montana Supreme Court set a 70 day 
briefing schedule for · the reconsideration of the case on remand 
from the United States Supreme Court and set oral argument for 
November 2, 1977. On motion of the appellant over the State's 
objection, the hearing was vacated and rescheduled for December 
14, 1977, and appellant was granted a 30 day extension of the 
time for filing his brief. Appellant's brief was filed October 3, 
1977. The State's brief was filed November 7, 1977, following a 
three-day extension of time granted by the Court. The case was 
argued to the five-justice court on December 14, 1977, and 
- -
reargued before the newly constituted seven-justice court, on the 
court's sua sponte order, on March 13, 1978. The Court affirmed; 3 mon+~ 
the conviction and sentence on June 7, 1978. McKenzie v. Montana, ( +0 J«c..·,d1 
177 Mont.280, 581 P.2d 1205 (1978). Appellant petitioned for~ 
rehearing on June 19, 1978, and the Court entered its order 
denying rehearing on July 25, 1978. 
McKenzie filed a petition for certiorari in the United States 
Supreme Court on October 23, 1978. In November, 1978, McKenzie 
filed a petition for review before the Sentence Review Division. 
He concurrently asked the United States Supreme Court to stay 
proceedings on his cert petition. The Sentence Review Division 
conducted its hearing on December 11, 1978. On December 27, 1979, 
the Sentence Review Division entered its order denying the 
petition. McKenzie attempted to appeal the decision, but the 
Montana Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on February 20, 1979. 
McKenzie then filed a second petition for certiorari directed at 
the judgment of the Sentence Review Division. On June 25, 1979, 
the Supreme Court entered an order granting the petition forcer-
tiorari filed the previous October and remanding the case for 
further consideration in light of Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 
510 (1979). McKenzie v. Montana, 443 U.S.903 (1979). The Court 
entered an order the same day denying the petition directed to 
the decision of the Sentence Review Division. McKenzie v. 
Montana, 443 U.S. 912 (1979). 
C. Third Direct Appeal 
On August 15, 1979, the Montana Supreme Court entered an order 
establishing a 75 day briefing schedule on the case and setting 
oral argument for October 29, 1979. The Court adhered to the 
schedule established in the order. On February 26, 1980, the 
Court entered its opinion affirming the conviction and sentence. 
McKenzie v. Montana, 186 Mont. 481, 608 P.2d 428 (1980). The 
Court denied rehearing on March 31, 1980. On July 26, 1980, 
pursuant to an extension of time granted by the United States 
Supreme Court, a petition for certiorari was filed. The State 
received a 15 day extension and filed its brief in response on 
September 11, 1980. On December 8, 1980, the Court entered its 
order denying the petition. McKenzie v. Montana, 449 U.S. 1050 
(1980). 
D. Post-Conviction Relief 
On January 5, 1981, McKenzie filed a petition for post-conviction 
relief in the District Court for the Eighth Judicial District 
pursuant to Title 46, Chapters 21 and 22, Mont. Code Ann. The 
State filed its answer and motion to dismiss the petition on 
January 21, 1981. The motion was heard on January 27, 1981, and 
on March 1, 1981, the court entered its order denying the 
petition. 
-· -
McKenzie promptly filed a notice of appeal, in part because the 
court had earlier set March 20, 1981 as the date for his execu-
tion. The State moved for an expedited appeal, and in response 
the Montana Supreme Court set a briefing schedule which required 
the appellant's brief to be filed twenty days after the filing of 
the record on appeal and gave the State twenty days to respond. 
on May 28, 1981, the Court set oral argument for June 8, 1981. on 
October 29, 1981, the Court entered its opinion affirming the 
denial of post-conviction relief. McKenzie v. Osborne, 195 Mont. 
26, 640 P.2d 368 (1981). The Court denied rehearing on November 
25, 1981. 
II. FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS 
A. First Petition 
on December 23, 1981, McKenzie filed a petition for federar--
habeas corpus under 28 USC section 2254. On February 19, 1982, 
the court entered an order setting a scheduling conference for 
February 26, 1982. The court vacated the conference on its own 
motion on February 25, 1982. On April 30, 1982, the State filed _/ 1 <4 l\,~H, 
its answer sua sponte. The parties then corresponded with the i , ~ 
court at length seeking direction as to a schedule for further ' ,..-.-o q-t-· 
proceedings. On September 13, 1982, the court entered an order ~ +o 
setting a briefing schedule on cross-motions for swnmary judgment -. f\£0..~1 " ' 
to be filed regarding the 21 issues raised in the petition. The \ 
briefing was completed on January 3, 1983. On October 28, 1982, / 
the court had entered its order setting oral argument on the / 
motions for February 17, 1983. Following the hearing the court✓ 
directed the parties to file proposed findings and conclusions,> 
which were filed March 23, 1983. / 1~ rM""°"r-
--1:o 
C?n July 20, 1984, the court entered an order gr':1nting swnm':1ry de..c .. .'iCl e_ 
Judgment for the State on seventeen of the claims, reserving, 
ruling on one, and setting an evidentiary hearing on two of the ' , 
claims for October 4, 1984. The parties promptly moved for leave 
to conduct discovery. On September 10, 1984, the court entered an 
order resetting the hearing to November 7, 1984, and allowing the 
parties to conduct discovery. A three-day evidentiary hearing was ,.,. =0 nt-~ 
held as scheduled. The court directed the parties to file 
proposed findings and briefs, which were completed on January 7, 
1985. 
On August 16, 1985, the court entered its findings, conclusions, 
memorandum, and order dismissing the remaining claims. McKenzie . 
applied for and was granted a certificate of probable cause, and 
promptly filed a notice of appeal. 
--+o 
' . ciu .. \ 6.-€.. 
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B. First Appeal 
McKenzie filed his Appellant's Brief on December 23, 1985. The 
State's brief in response was filed January 23, 1986. The case 
was argued before a three-judge panel on May 9, 1986, in Seattle, 
Washington. On October 8, 1986, the panel decision affirming the 
dismissal of the petition was filed. McKenzie v. Risley, 801 F.2d 
1519 (9th Cir. 1986). After a fourteen day extension of time was 
granted, McKenzie filed a petition for rehearing and suggestion]S =o"4- ~ 
for rehearing en bane on November 5, 1986. A response to a + ~ 
petition for rehearing may not be filed unless the court so o~r<Vl • 
directs. Rule 40, Fed. R. App. P. On March 2, 1987, more than ~ n ~ ~n • 
five months after the filing of the petition, the court ordered~ 
the State to file a response on or before March 23. The State's \ 
response was timely filed, and on April 29, 1987, the court / 
entered an order granting rehearing en bane. \ I ~..z..u.r. 
+o 
On May 20, 1987, the court ordered the filing of supplemental fr~ce~ 
briefs and set the hearing for August 12, 1987. The hearing was . 
held as scheduled, and on March 10, 1988, the opinion of the en . en •;OJ, 
bane court affirming the judgment was filed. McKenzie v. Risley t- _/ 
842 F.2d 1525 (9th Cir.1988)(en bane). McKenzie petitioned for / 
rehearing on March 28, 1988-,- and on May 10, 1988, the court 
entered its order denying rehearing. 
Pursuant to an extension of time granted without objection, 
McKenzie filed a petition for certiorari in the United States 
Supreme Court on August 8, 1988. The State's brief in opposition 
was filed September 14, 1988. The matter is now pending before 
the United States Supreme Court. 
c. Second Petition 
One of the issues raised in McKenzie's first habeas corpus 
petition was the argument that infliction of the death penalty by 
hanging violated the Eighth Amendment. Petition, para. 34. In 
1983, while the petition was pending, the Montana Legislature 
amended the applicable statute, section 46-19-103, MCA, to 
authorize execution by lethal injection if the defendant so 
elects. The State stipulated that McKenzie be allowed to file a 
second federal habeas petition challenging the statute as amended 
if he promptly sought to exhaust his state remedies on the issue 
and promptly filed his federal petition if the State courts 
denied relief. Mckenzie filed a petition for habeas corpus in the 
Montana Supreme Court on February 22, 1985, raising the death 
penalty issue and an unrelated issue alleging that the prosecutor 
engaged in improper ex parte discussions with the sentencing 
judge regarding sentencing. The latter issue was based on 
evidence brought to light during the evidentiary hearing on the 
first petition. On the same day, the Montana Supreme Court 
entered an order directing the State to file a response within 
thirty days. The State's response was filed March 25, 1985, and 
- -
on April 16, 1985, the Montana Supreme Court entered an order 
denying the petition. 
On or about June 27, 1985, McKenzie filed a second petition for 
habeas corpus under section 2254, raising the issues rejected by 
the Montana Supreme Court in its April 16 order. On August 12, 
1985, the court entered its order requiring the State to file a 
response on or before September 16, 1985. The State's answer was 
filed September 12, 1985, accompanied by a motion for summary 
judgment with supporting brief and affidavit. The court ordered 
McKenzie to file a brief in response by October 18, 1985, and set 
a hearing for November 22, 1985. McKenzie filed a brief in 
opposition and motion for an evidentiary hearing. The hearing was 
held as scheduled. 
On March 3, 1987, the court entered an order granting the State's 
motion for summary judgment. McKenzie filed a motion for a 
certificate of probable cause and a notice of appeal on March 27, 
1987. The State filed its brief in opposition on April 2, 1987. 
Fifteen months later, on May 17, 1988, after receiving a letter 
from the Attorney General commenting on the delay in ruling on 
the pending motion, Judge Battin issued an order denying the 
certificate of probable cause. McKenzie filed a motion with the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on July 18, 1988 seeking a 
certificate of probable cause. On July 28, 1988, without waiting 
for a response from the State, the court granted the motion. The 
court's order set a briefing schedule which will be completed 
November 18, 1988. 
- -
&rJ./:. . d c~1~ ; /JO<-wl /98.;J,, 
Ronald Allen Smith~ Risley (McCormick) 
The Montana Supreme Court made its final disposition of 
this case on August 14, 1986, when it denied Smith's 
petition for post-conviction relief. In its order the 
Court dismissed the eight claims raised, explaining that 
the claims had either been fully and finally litigated, 
or because they were procedurally barred by section 
46-21-105, MCA. It found the claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel to be without merit. 
Smith then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpu~ 
and motion for stay of execution of sentence of death on 
October 10, 1986 in federal court. The Missoula 
Division of the United States District Court, 
Judge Charles Lovell presiding, granted the motion for 
stay pending final disposition of the petition. 
Following the filing of an amended petition on 
February 27, 1987, both parties agreed that the matter 
was ripe for summary judgment. The State filed a motion 
for summary judgment and a ,notion to strike due to 
procedural bars on August 3, 1987, and Smith filed a 
motion for summary judgment on September 2, 1987. 
Briefing of the motions was completed January 29, 1988, 
a nd a hearing was held before Judge Lovell on 
February 26, 1988. 
~1-, l"f\on ~~s 
The District Court issued its opinion on July 19, 1988~~ 
explaining that because Smith's claims had not been 
fairly presented to the Montana Supreme Court and that 
further State remedies were procedurally barred under 
Montana's statutes, its duty was to examine the "cause 
and prejudice" requirements set out in Wainwright ~ 
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). (Where issues o f federal law 
are not resolved on the merits in state proceedings due 
to petitioner's failure to raise them as required by 
state procedure, the claims are barred in a federal 
habeas proceeding unless the petitioner can show "cause" 
for failure to raise them and "prejudice" resulting from 
the errors. Wainwright, supra.) Smith claimed that 
cause was established by reason of ineffective 
assistance of counsel as well as "external factors." 
The Court cited Murray~ Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986) 
to support its holding that the inadvertent failure of 
counsel to raise a particular claim on appeal does not 
constitute cause for a procedural default, granted the 
,. I 
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State's motion to strike the new claims, and addressed 
only the claims decided on their merits by the Montana 
Supreme Court, affirming its decisions. The United 
States District Court denied Smith's motion for summary 
judgment, granted the State's motion for summary 
judgment, and denied Smith's petition for writ of habeas 
corpus. 
Smith mailed a notice of appeal on August 16, 1988, and 
a motion for certificate of probable cause on August 18, 
1988. District Court Judge Lovell ruled that probable 
cause existed for the issuance of a certificate 
authorizing Smith to appeal his decision on August 22, 
1988. A motion for appointment of co-counsel on appeal 
was mailed by Smith's attorney on August 30, 1988, and 
the State filed notice of change of counsel on 
September 8, 1988. No further activity has occurred as 
of September 12, 1988. 
i A..-(_ ";J T _Q.M, 
,:::, l"f'I\\Ol'\'4-h S 
- -
8,rJk... o-t-· C,_,e✓.,-,,,.11.- ; /-Jc~;/ I '17:>-
State Y...:_ Fitzpatrick: 
The Montana Supreme Court made final disposition of 
this case on July 25, 1984, when it rejected 
Fitzpatrick's claim that the law under which his 
execution date was set constituted an unlawful bill of 
attainder . 
Prior to final disposition by the Montana courts, 
/ on December 8, 1983, Fitzpatrick filed a petition for a~. 
/
/ writ of habeas corpus in the United States District \ 
Court for the District of Montana. On that date, 
I District Judge James Battin issued an order staying 
Fitzpatrick's execution. 
On February 2, 1984, the district court ordered 
that the respondent answer the habeas corpus petition,· 
before April 1, 1984. The respondent moved for and was 
granted a ten-day extension of time, until April 11,, 
198 4 , to file its answer. The answer was filed \ \ ~ rn o•v•-~ 
April 11 , 19 8 4 . . · 
On October 11, 1984, the respondent filed a motion -" -h q .(__-. ~ 0 
for summary judgment and brief in support of the motion. 
On January 7, 1985, Fitzpatrick filed a motion for an 
evidentiary hearing and a -cross-motion for summary 
C::·r c.J.. 
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judgment, along with a supporting memorandum. At that 
time, Fitzpatrick also filed a motion to amend his 
petition. The motion to amend was granted by the 
district court on January 31, 1985. 
The respondent filed an answer to the amended 
\ petition and a reply brief in support of its motion for 
summary judgment on February 8, 1985. 
Oral argument on the cross-motions for summary 
judgment was heard on April 26, 1985. In all, 19 issues , 
were argued before the Court. ✓~ 
On June 14, 1985, Fitzpatrick moved to supplement I 
the record. The respondent filed a response opposing ', ~ Ll eu.r !: """7 t-
the motion on July 1, 1985. No resolution of the motion / i 
. f d ' h d ,I \ c.. ~ is oun in t e recor . • ~'1 c..\o-e. -- ~ . 
The cross-motions for summary judgment were 
submitted for decision for two years, from April 2 6 r/ 
1985, until April 28, 1987, when the district court 
entered an order granting the respondent's motion for 
summary judgment and denying Fitzpatrick's motion for 
summary judgment. 
On May 7, 1987, Fitzpatrick moved to alter or amend 
the judgment. The respondent filed a response on 
,!'1ay ~4, 1987. On June 15, 1987, the District Court 
denied the motion to amend its judgment, but did amend 
its memorandum opinion to clarify a conclusion of law. 
Fitzpatrick filed a notice of appeal and motion for 
certificate of probable cause on July 3, 1987. The 
, 
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certificate of record 
on October 6, 1987. 
was filed in the Court of Appeal ~ 
On September 10, 1987, Fitzpatrick's attorney filed 
a motion for appointment of co-counsel. The motion was 
granted on November 10, 1987. Fitzpatrick's opening 
brief was due December 28, 1987. 
On December 7, 1987, Fitzpatrick filed a motion for 
extension of time to file his brief and a motion for 
leave to file an enlarged brief. The Ninth Circuit 
granted an extension of time until February 8, 1988, to 
file the brief, but denied the motion to file an : 
oversized brief. 
On February 8, 1988, Fitzpatrick moved for an '. 
extension of time until February 17, 1988, to file his 
brief and renewed his motion to file an enlarged brief 
(over 50 pages). Before the Ninth Circuit issued a 
ruling on his motions, Fitzpatrick, on February 18, 
1988, filed a 71-page brief discussing ten issues. The 
Court, on March 2, 1988, issued an order allowing 
Fitzpatrick to file the oversized brief out of time. In 
the order, the Court stated that the respondent's brief 
was due April 1, 1988. 
The respondent requested and received one extension 
of time for filing its brief. The respondent's brief 
was filed April 20, 1988. Fitzpatrick's reply brief was 
due May 6, 1988. He obtained one telephonic extension 
of time from the Clerk of Court and filed his reply 
brief on May 19, 1988. 
The appeal was orally argued before a three-judge 
panel in Seattle, Washington, on July 12, 1988. The 
appeal is currently submitted and a decision is ~ endin~: 
\ 
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- -STATE OF MISSISSIPPI 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
TELEFAX NUMBER (601) 359-3796 
CARROLL GARTIN JUSTICE BUILDING 
POST OFFICE BOX 220 
JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI 39205-0220 
TELEPHONE (601) 359-3680 
January 19, 1989 
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Retired 
Supreme Court of the United States 
1 First Street, N.E. 
Washington, D.C. 20543 
'JAN 2 3 1989 
RE: Ad Hoc Committee On Federal Habeas 
Dear Justice Powell: 
~ 
Attorney General Moore referred your request for 
statistics concerning the delay found so often in death 
penalty appeals to me as I am the assistant charged with 
handling those cases in this office. I spoke with Professor 
Pearson earlier and have today forwarded to him the 
requested statistics on Mississippi death penalty cases. 
This office stands ready to assist you and your committee in 
any way necessary to complete your task. 
With best wishes, I am 
MLW/ds 
cc: Judge Charles Clark 
Professor Albert Pearson 
- -
lfp/ss 01/23/89 ADC SALLY-POW 
Ad Hoc Committee on Habeas Corpus 
MEMO TO HEW: 
I think it will be appropriate, and not too burden-
some to mail to members of the Committee and to our Secre-





January 24, 1989 
Dear Justice Huntley: 
A brief note to thank you for the copy of your let~ 
ter of January 18 to Professor Pearson. I note that, in 
your view, the primary blame for the serious delays in the 
capital cases is a failure to focus on inadequate "calendar 
management." 
I am sending copies to members of the Committee. 
Sincerely, 
Hon. Robert C. Huntley, Jr. 
Justice 
Supreme Court of Idaho 
451 W. State Street 
Boise, Idaho 83720 
lfp/ ss 
cc: Hon. Paul H. Roney 
Hon. Charles Clark 
Hon. Barefoot Sanders 
Hon. William Terrell Hodges 
William L. Burchill, Jr., Esquire 
- -
January 26 , 1989 
~d Hoc Committee Meeting - Monday , January 30, 9:30 a.m. 
Memo to Marshal'!'-'\ Office: 
We would like to have the usual coffee and tea for 
our co~nittee meeting. As I understand , we order this from 
the cafeteria and Harry FPnwick will arrange for it to b~ 
served. 
I understand that the Lawyer ' s Lounge, across from 
the Marshal'~ Office will he availahle. 
L.F.P., Jr . 
~5 
re: mh~ Chief Ju~tice 
~oel J. Augustyn, Esquire 
Mr. Harrv Fenwick 
- -THE 
MICHIE COMPANY 
4C7 LAW PUBLISHERS SINCE 1855 
The Honorable Lewis F. 
Retired Justice of the 
One First Street, N.E. 
Washington, DC 20543 
1 TOWN HALL SQUARE, CHARLOTTESVILLE, VIRGINIA 
804-972-7600 
I 
January 27, 1989 
I 
Powell, Jr. 
United States Supreme Court 
-
(All Correspondence) 
P.O. BOX 7587 
CHARLOTTESVILLE, VIRGINIA 
22906-7587 
Re: Special Committee on Habeas Corpus Review of Capital Sentences 
Dear Justice Powell: 
Enclosed with our compliments is a set of our recent two-volume publication, 
Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure , by James S. Liebman, Associate 
Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law. 
Prior to his joining the faculty at Columbia, Liebman, a former law clerk 
to Justice John Paul Stephens, served as Assistant Counsel to the NAACP Legal 
Defense Fund for six years, where he gained unsurpassed expertise in trying 
and writing about federal habeas corpus cases. During his tenure with the Legal 
Defense Fund, Liebman prepared the Federal Habeas Corpus Manual for Capital 
Cases . That manual ultimately became the nucleus for his new work, which is 
an encyclopedic guide to the litigation and adjudication of federal habeas corpus 
cases. 
We are extremely pleased to provide you with a set of the publication in 
the hope that it will contribute meaningfully to the work of the Special Committee 
on Habeas Corpus Review of Capital Sentences. 
enclosure 








TO: Justice Powell January 29, 1989 
FROM: Hew 
RE: Habeas Proposals 
1. Chief Justice's Proposal 
This proposal would amend 28 U.S.C. §2244 to apply a 
one year statute of limitations in capital cases only. The 
statute would run from the time of "exhaustion" or the "last 
dispositive order on the merits before the federal peti-
tion." This essentially means that the statute would not 
come into play until after state habeas review. The statute 
would apply only where the state has provided a lawyer 
throughout the state post-conviction proceedings and for one 
year thereafter. The function of this proposal (in terms of 
delay) would be to force the inmate to move into federal 
court soon after state collateral review ended. 
2. Judge Hodges' Proposal 
The Hodges proposal (as originally submitted Aug. 29) 
also provides for a one year statute of limitations for fed-
eral habeas claims. The statute would run, however, from 
the date at which state conviction becomes final. An inmate 
would be required to file a federal petition within one year 
despite the fact that state collateral review had not oc-
curred, but the federal dct would stay its proceedings until 
'· 
' 
either (a) state remedies have been exhausted or (b) the 
state waives the exhaustion requirement. Once exhaustion or 
waiver occurred, the dct could proceed with the federal pe-
titian. Judge Hodges' proposal allows for exceptions in 
cases of new Supreme Court decisions or newly discovered 
facts. 
At the last meeting, my recollection was that Judge 
Hodges described his proposal somewhat differently. Rather 
than requiring the inmate to file in federal court prior to 
exhaustion of state remedies to toll the statute, the stat-
ute would simply be tolled during the period of time that 
state habeas proceedings occurring. Once state habeas pro-
ceedings ended, the statute would then pick up where it left 
off and begin to run again. I think this version of the 
Hodges plan is simpler. The Judge Hodges' proposal has the 
benefit of encouraging inmates to proceed expeditiously to 
collateral review in both federal and state systems as soon 
as the conviction is final rather than waiting around for a 
warrant to be signed . This is appropriate in the unique 
captial context: the non-capital inmate has every incentive 
to seek habeas as soon as possible, but the captial inmate 
wants only delay. I note that there is no reason that the 




THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
-
The Honorable Donald 
Chief Judge 
P.O. Box 75908 
St. Paul, Minnesota 
Dear Don, 
-
~ltpTttttt ~ourl of t4t 1fuittb ~tattg 
Jl'ag4ittghtn. ~. ~. 2llffe)!.~ 
dd_,I~~ 
February 16, 1989 
P. Lay 
55175 
FEB 2 7 1989 
Thanks very much for sending me a copy of your 
submission to the Powell Committee on Habeas Corpus. I do 
not think I agree with your comments about Wainwright v. 
=~ the basis of fragmentary information I think 
/ there is probably a good deal of merit to your comment about 
Rose v. Lundy d its effect in capital cases. I am sure 
the work of e Powell committee will be improved by 
u · from knowledgeable judges in the field like you. 
Sincerely, ;&~r 
cc: Justice Powell 
0 ~() 
~ Of Tl-IE I.I.. 
~«'G~l1t1~ 
!!: (fl - ;..\ >. 
L. RALPH MECHAM 
DIRECTOR 
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE 
JAMES E. MACKLIN. JR. 
DEPUTY DIRECTOR 
·,p r . .. ~ -""' 
UNITED STATES COURTS 
WASHJNGlDN, D.C. 20544 
February 16, 1989 
Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Associate Justice, Retired 
Supreme Court of the United States 
1 First Street, N. E. 
Washington, D. C. 20543 
Dear Justice Powell: 
FE~ 2 4 1989 
WILLIAM R. BURCHILL, JR. 
GENERAL COUNSEL 
I know that you are interested in following the agenda of the newly 
commissioned Judicial Conference Federal Courts Study Committee, which 
held its first meeting on February 3. 
I thought that you might like to see the enclosed memorandum 
prepared by Judge Weis of the Third Circuit, chairman of the Federal 
Courts Study Committee, designating three subcommittees and proposing 
relevant issues to be examined by each of them. We are making this 
communication available to all chairmen of Judicial Conference 
committees. 
I was very sorry to learn of your recent hospitalization and hope that 
you will be completely recovered by the time this letter reaches you. With 
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Federal Courts Study Committee 
22716 United Sta.tcs Courtho&Uc 
· Independence Mall West 
(,()1 Market Street 
Philadelphia, PA 19106-1722 
Telephone: 21.S-S97-3320 
FaoimiJc: 215-597-33.SO 
February 6, 1989 
Federal Courts Study Commission Members 
Judge Weis 
Dear Conunittee Member&: 
P. 0? 
J. Vlnccnl Aprilc. II 
Judie JOk A. Cabranu 
Chief Ju11i« Ke ith M. Callow 
Chkf Judce Levin H. Campbell 
~rd S. G. Denni,, Jr. 
Sen.tor Char1u E. Gn1o&lcy 
Morris Harttll 
Senator Howell ltcnin 
C.on1=man Robert W . Knrcnmc,er 
J11dgc J11di1h N. Keep 
Pro(cuor Rex E. Lee 
Congrusman Ca ri~ J. Moorhc ~d 
Di•n• Gribbon Mott 
Judsc Richard A P<>&~r 
As promised, here is a list of subcommittees and the 
topics which I hope each will undertake. 
I. ROLE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS AND RELATIONSHIP TO STATE COURTS 
Honorable Richard A. Posner, Chairman 
Chief Justice Callow 
Congressman Kastenmeier 
Professor Rex Le• 
1. Overall concept or the federal courts, their role 
and citizen access. 
2. Relationship with ~dministrative agencies and 
Article l courts. 
3. Diversity Jurisdiction. Should it be eliminated or 
limited? Ir trials continue in district courts, should 
appellate proceedings be transferred to state appellate courts? 
4. WorJonens ' Compensation. Should Federa l Employers' 
Liability and Jones Act cases be transferred to the Harbor and 
Longshoremen Act procedures? 
5. Pendent Jurisdiction. Should it be limited or 
expanded. 
6. Bankruptcy. Should much or the proceedings be 
assigned to an administrative body with reference to bankruptcy 
judges o n l y of legal issues? 
l 
• • 
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7. :should fede~~l -question issues trom state _courts be 
sent in the tirst instance -to the tederal court ot appeals, 
rather than the United States Supremo court. · 
8. Should a permanent c_omrniss ion be establ !shed. 
II, STRUCTURE Of THE FEDERAL COURT& 
Honorable Leyin·H. Campbell, Chainnan 
Mr. J. Vincent Aprile, rr 
Mr. Morris Harrell 
Senator Howell Heflin 
Honorable Judith N. Keep 
1. Can th$ United States Courts ot Appeals function as 
one National Court of Appeals operating through circuit divisions 
with provision& for a central .en~ division. 
2. Should district court be given greater flexibility 
in devising methods for re~olving complex cases or disputes 
outside the mainstream of traditional adversary proceedings. 
3. What should be the role of magistrates_· in tho 
district courts. Should they continue to be appointed by the 
district courts. 
4. Structure or the role or the Judicial conference of 
the United States and the circuit Councils. Is a separation 
between administrative and judicial function desirable. Should 
the district courts operate under more decentralized 
administrative methods. 
5. Role of the Administrative Office and the Federal 
Judicial Center. The budget process. 
6. How can delays in filling vacancies on the bench be 
rQdUced? 
7. Should district and circuit boundaries be revised? 
Should geograph i cal boundaries be de-emphasized in adjudication? 
Should the number ot places ot hearing court be reviewed and 
possibly reduced? 
rrr, HORK IPAD OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 
Honorable Jose A. cabranes, Chainnan 
Edward S.G. Dennis, Jr. 
Senator Charles E- Grassley 
Ms. Diana Cribbon Motz 
2 
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·1. Should there be statutory prov ls ions tor the 
transfer ot cases, both civil and criminal, between state and 
!ederal courts, both at trial and appellate levels? 
2. Complex multi-district and multi-state litigdtion. 
What statutory provisions would be necessary to arrange more 
ef!icient disposition or this type o! litigation? 
J. Trial of federal crimes in state courts. Would 
this lessen the load on the fed~ral courts and reassign the loads 
between state and !ederal courts? 
4. Shifting of some federal question cases to state 
courts. 
5. Alternative Dispute Resolution -- mediation , 
arbitration, summary trials, "rent-a-judge" systems. 
6. Appeals from !ederal administrative agencies to 
district courts in the first instance with appeal to courts of 
appeals by leave only. 
7. Should stato administrative exhaustion be a 
prerequisite to some actions in federal courts? 
a. Utilization of senior judges. 
9. Incentives and disincentives in litigation, 
including tee shifting. simplification of fee assessments where 
presently permitted by statutes. 
10. Media access and enhancement of public 
understanding of the courts. 
11. Judicial conduct and disability proceedings. 
12. statutory suggestions for eliminations of 
unnecessary litigation, e.g., establishment of federal statute of 
limitations, designation of private cause of action where 
intended, regulation of discovery; etc , 
13. Legal and technical support staff. Can 
limitations be removed on trial and appellate~ court use of expert 
and technical assistance from outside · sources as an aid to 
adjudication. 
The division of topics is necessarily arbitrary and in 
some areas the work of the subcommittees may overlap, so that 
some coordination will bQ necessary. However, I hope that all of 
. . 
J 
~ , · 
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.us ;..,111 be---kept _ intonned .ot the work of , the subcommittees -as • it 
proceeds. I would anticipate too that as -we go along, additional · 
topics tor revi~w will be presented to us and as they come up I 
will assign them to the variou& subcommittees. 
Might I suggest that each subcommittee retain a 
reporter -- probably a law school professor who is interested in 
the work -- to assist in research and writing. Our budget at the 
present time will permit paying $5,000 for reporter plus 
·travelling expenses tor the period ;up untii September 1, 1989, 
and the sam~ amount for the remainder of our term. As you can 
see, the acquisition ot wealth cannot be the dominant motive for 
accepting .that emplo}'ltlent. However, I believe that many law· 
school faculty members would enthusiastically welcome the 
opportunity to work with the Committee and would be able to 
enlist the aid o! student researchers. 
As we discussed at the meeting on Friday, advisory 
panels may bG of substantial assistance to the subcommittees. 
Within the next tew days, I will tallow up with you on the use 
of advisory panels. In addition, a number ot individuals and 
organizations have and will be volunteering to work with us and 
we will want to utilize those resources as well. 
As you know, we also have available to us the 
tacilities of the Judicial Center and the Administrative Office 
to the extent that they can accommodate our needs. To facilitate 
the process, might I suggest that you contact Bill Slate with 
your specitic needs for assistance rrom those offices so that we 
may coordinate our request to them. 
We are hopeful that the Department o! Justice will 
undertake one or more research projects at its expense which will 
be made available to the Committees. We will keep you advised on 
the progress o! that 8ffort. 
In addition, various groups within the American Bar 
Association, the Judicial Con!erences, and many others, have been 
working on projects which are exploring matters within our area , 
of interests. We will try to match up those groups with the 
three subconunittees as well. 
As we discussed at our initial meeting, I hope that we 
can have our tour regional "outreach" meetings scheduled some 
time in March, prererably before March 20, 1989. To repeat 
those assignments 
So&ton -- Judge Campbell presiding, Judge Cabranes, 
Judge Weis. 
Atl~nta -- Judge Weis presiding, Mr. Harrell, Ms. Moti. 
4 
ChicaqQ -- J1.1dge Posner presiding, Mr. ApFiie~ Mr. 
Dennis. · 
Lo~_hngeles -- Chief Justice Callow presiding, Judge 
Keep, Professor Lee. · 
Again, in deference to the confining schedules of our 
congressional members you have not been assigned to a regional 
meeting. However, if you can attend or at your discretion, 
designate a staff member to attend, it would benerit the process 
immeasurably. 
Bill Slate will be assisting with the details of the 
meetings, including date selection, meeting sites, and 
notification of interested parties. 
Indeed, in all that we do we should keep Bill Slate 
advised so that he can keep the full committee informed of the 
many different efforts which will be underway simultaneously. 
Lastly, we need to identify the date of our next full 
committee meeting. As Congressman Moorhead noted the proposed 
March 30 date falls in the middle of a congressional working 
receGs period. May I suggest either the morning of Monday, 
April 3 or Monday, April 10 beginning at 8:30 a.~. at the Supre~e 
Court in Washington. Elizabeth Bege will contact your office in 
the next several days to ascertain your preference. 
We have a busy and exciting year ahead of us. I look 
forward to working with all of you. 
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National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers 
February 17, 1989 
The Honorable Lewis F. Powell 
1110 Vermont Avenue, NW 
Suite 1150 
Washington, DC 20005 j_ 
202-872-8688 - '--' 
Fax: 202-331-8269 
ti~ I~ ur 
FEP 2 1 1989 
Chairman, Special Committee on Habeas Corpus 
Review of Capital Sentences 
Supreme Court of the United States 
One First Street, N.E. 
Washington, D.C. 20543 
Dear Justice Powell: 
I am writing to express this Association's great 
interest in the work of the Special Committee on Habeas 
Corpus Review of Capital Sentences. 
Among the membership of NACDL are some of the foremost 
experts in the nation on all stages of capital litigation--
including public and private defense counsel as well as law 
professors. We share a deep commitment to ensuring that 
competent counsel is available to capital defendants 
throughout the process, and a concern that the criminal 
justice system as a whole suffers when a trial counsel's 
inexperience or incompetence leads to a subsequent review 
process which many find "chaotic" and unacceptable. 
I have recently appointed a special NACDL committee to 
review problems relating to habeas review in capital cases, 
to provide information and assistance to, and to serve as 
liaison with, both your Committee and the congressional 
committees which will receive and review your Committee's 
final report and recommendations. 
I raspectfully urge yo~ to ccnve ne publ i c hea~ings, to 
receive and consider the widest possible range of views and 
information regarding the present system of capital habeas 
review and any potential modifications thereof, and I 
request that a representative of NACDL's habeas committee be 
permitted to testify. 
I am aware that the Chief Justice, in response to a 
similar request from the American Bar Association in August, 
suggested that no hearings would be held or public comment 
solicited. We respectfully urge reconsideration of this 
position, in light of the Congress's subsequent decision to 
elevate the Committee's work to quasi-legislative status. 
(I refer to section 7323 of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, 
I' 
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which requests legislative recommendations from the Committee, 
and requires expeditious and "faithful" consideration thereof by 
the Congress). 
The 101st Congress will confront few issues more important 
than this. We hope we will have an opportunity to assist your 
Committee in laying before the Congress the fullest possible 
e xposition of the issues and the legislative options. 
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MEMORANDUM 
TO: Justice Powell February 22, 1989 
FROM: Hew 
RE: Habeas Day 
The Court handed down three habeas corpus cases today 
(copies attached): 
1. Teague v. Lane: This case is potentially the most 
important of the three, but has turned out to be something 
of a mess. A plurality (SOC, WHR, AS, AMK) would apply Jus-
tice Harlan's test for retroactivity of newly decided cases 
_____________,, - ~ 
on habeas (your position in e.g., Hankerson v. North Caroli-
na) . BRW, HAB, and JPS concurred in part and/or concurred 
in the judgment. JPS stated that he agreed in general that ___. 
Justice Harlan's rule should apply, but that the rule should 
not apply to prevent habeas claims of "fundamental unfair-
ness." WJB and TM dissented. The adoption of the Harlan 
rule would of course be of great benefit in enforcing final-
ity. In capital cases, the rule would prevent the frequent 
~
practice of inmates filing last minute stay applications 
claiming that their case should be held for numerous cases 
in which cert. has been granted. I expect that there will 
be an attempt to undermine Teague, however, by arguing that 
every claim in a capital case involves "fundamental fair-
ness" or the like, and must thus come under an exception to 









2. Harris v. Reed: In this case, HAB wrote for 8 Jus-
tices to apply the Michigan v. Long/ ~lain statement rule ~ o 
habeas cases. That is, federal habeas courts will not honor 
a state's procedural bar rule unless the state court made a 
"plain statement" that the petr's claim was barred. Ambigu-
ities will be resolved in s f federal habeas review on 
the merits. Only Justice Kennedy dissented . Miguel wanted 
me to make clear that he worked on the AMK dissent, and that 
Ned ~oley worked on the HAB majority. 
3. Castille v. Peoples: This is an exhaustion case. -
The unanimous Court held that a petr's claim is not exhaust-
~ --ed where he has presented it only to a state forum in which 
review is discretionary, and which will not entertain the 
claim unless there are "special and important reasons there-
✓ 
for." The Court also reaffirmed (9-0!) the Engle rule that 
where a non-exhausted claim would clearly be barred under 
D<t 
the state's procedural rules, the dct need not dismiss for 
lack of exhaustion, but may find the claim procedurally 
barred outright. (One of the chief points of AMK's Harris 
dissent is that the reaffirmance of Engle and the majority's 







February 24, 1989 
Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas 
Dear Mr. Margolin: 
Thank you for your letter of February 17. I can, 
of course, understand the interest of your organization in 
the work of this Committee. At this time, as you noted, 
there are no plans for a public hearing. We are merely a 
temporary committee of the Judicial Conference, and report 
to it. In this respect, I do not think the Anti-Drug Abuse 
Act (§7323) makes a difference, as the Judicial Conference 
itself is authorized by law to report to Congress. 
I can assure you that we are sensitive to your con-
cerns, and agree wholeheartedly that a major problem has 
been the unavailability at an early date of competent coun-
sel to represent capital case defendants on collateral re-
view. We are seeking the assistance in this respect of the 
Attorneys General of the six states in CA5 and CAll. 
I am sure that you know the American Bar Associa-
tion is engaged in a broader study of federal habeas corpus, 
and I believe a member of your organization may be on its 
Committee. To the extent it may prove useful, Judge Rubin 
(co-chair of the ABA Committee) and we have agreed to coop-
erate. 
Ephraim Margolin, Esquire 
President 
Sincerely, 
National Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers 
1110 Vermont Avenue, N.W. 
Suite 1150 
Washington, D. C. 20005 
lfp/ss 
CHAMBERS 01" 
~uitcb ~tatcs ~istrirt filourt 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 
1100 COMMERCE STREET 
DALLAS.TEXAS 75242 
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February 28, 1989 
The Honorable Lewis F. Powell 
Associate Justice, Ret. 
United States Supreme Court 
Washington, D.C. 20543 
Re: Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas 
Dear Justice Powell: 
;' MAR o 4 1989 ltL.~,...,,.~~ 
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As you know, in addition to serving on your Ad Hoc Habeas Committee, 
I am a member of the American Bar Association Habeas Task Force. As 
a member of that group I receive from time to time information 
relating to issues which we on your Committee are considering. 
The enclosed letter from Mr. Stephen B. Bright, Director of the 
Southern Prisoners' Defense Committee, is an example of the material 
which I am receiving. Do you think it would be appropriate to send 
this, and similar material (providing that it does not become too 
voluminous) to Al Pearson and the other members of your Ad Hoc 
Committee? I will be glad to do that if you think that it would be 
helpful. 
I have similar letters from Circuit Judge Alvin Rubin, State District 
Judge Stephens of North Carolina who tries felony cases, and two or 
three others. 
Judge Rubin, who is Co-Chair of the ABA Committee, has no problem --
in fact, favors -- sharing this information. 
I send my best wishes and warmest regards. 
S- --u,. fa1 It. Sincerely, 
Encl. ~ 
